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This paper focuses on stocks that experience major price changes. Using analyst
reports as a proxy, I nd that price events accompanied by information are followed
by drift, while no-information ones result in reversals. One interpretation of these
results is that investors underreact to news about fundamentals and overreact to other
shocks that move stock prices. Consistent with this hypothesis, information-based
price changes are more strongly correlated with future earnings surprises than no-
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1. Introduction
A large body of evidence suggests that at certain times investors underreact to informa-
tion contained in stock returns and at other times overreact. At the very shortest horizons
of up to a month, stock returns exhibit reversals (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990; Lehmann, 1990;
Jegadeesh, 1990). For 3- to 12-month horizons, there is strong evidence for positive auto-
correlation in returns (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). Finally, over long horizons of between
three and ve years, we again nd reversals (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985). The question of
which circumstances lead to underreaction and which ones to overreaction has been the focus
of much recent work, both on the theory and empirical fronts. This paper explores the be-
havior of returns after signicant stock price movements. Major price changes can be driven
by a number of factors, including new information about a rms prospects, liquidity shocks
a¤ecting current shareholders, and shifts in demand by uninformed investors. My focus is
on publicly available information. I compare how stock prices evolve subsequent to large
moves based on whether these moves are associated with new information that is available
to investors.
As a proxy for the presence of public information, I use recommendation-issuing analyst
reports.1 My basic logic is very simple: price events associated with new information are
more likely to be accompanied by analyst reports. I am not specically interested in whether
reports cause prices to move or whether they are released in reaction to moves. The former
cases obviously should be classied as information-based price movements. The latter are
a bit more complicated, as they require analysts to be more prone to issue reports (either
changing or maintaining their recommendations) when price changes are a result of new
information. This seems like a reasonable assumption, and to the extent that it does not
hold, it would bias against me nding any di¤erence in the post-event returns of the two
groups of stocks.
I restrict my sample to stocks that are actively covered by sell-side analysts and experience
1These reports are immediately available to a large group of investors, and their content quickly leaks to
non-subcribers as well.
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major price changes. A price event is classied as information-based if at least one analyst
report is published around it. In a regression framework, I nd that no-information price
events experience strong reversals, while information-based ones exhibit momentum. This
result is robust to inclusion of various controls (including volume and momentum), di¤erent
post-event horizons (ranging from ve to 40 trading days), various methods of measuring
abnormal returns, and exclusion of stocks most a¤ected by possible bid-ask bounce problems.
It holds for both large and small cap stocks, and is not driven by post-earnings announcement
drift well-established in the literature (Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 1990).2 When I include
only earnings announcements in my analysis, price events are followed by drift regardless of
their information status.3
Next I test whether investors can prot from the di¤erential market response to in-
formation revealed by analysts relative to other catalysts for price changes. I form four
calendar-time portfolios based on the direction of the price movement and on whether it was
information-based or not. Consistent with the regression ndings, stocks that move based
on analyst information exhibit strong momentum, while no-information stocks experience
reversals. Both phenomena are not only statistically signicant but also economically very
meaningful. An equally weighted portfolio that is long no-information losers and short no-
information winners (no-information portfolio) earns annualized abnormal returns of 20%
over a 20-trading day horizon (with an extraordinary Sharpe ratio of 1.66), and these returns
are substantially higher at short holding periods. A portfolio that is long information win-
ners and short information losers (information portfolio) earns annualized abnormal returns
of 16% (with a Sharpe ratio of 1.21), with the returns again higher for shorter horizons.
Combining the phenomena yields annual returns of close to 37%, indicating a potentially
extremely protable trading strategy.
2Vega (2006) nds that stocks associated with high probability of private information-based trading,
uniformly accepted public news surprises, and low media coverage experience low post-earnings announcement
drift, providing an example of how the presence of information (public or private) can a¤ect post-event returns.
3This should not be surprising given previous work. Moreover, it is quite probable that these price
movements reect new information about the rm, even if no analyst reports came out.
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The numbers are similar for value-weighted portfolios. They are weaker for the no-
information portfolio and substantially stronger for the information portfolio, resulting in
combined abnormal returns of 30% per year. As before, the results hold when I exclude
stocks most subject to the bid-ask bounce e¤ect. They also do not change if I place more
weight on periods when the portfolios contain more stocks (by running weighted least squares
regressions).
One interpretation of my ndings is that investors underreact to relevant new information
about a rm and overreact to price movements caused by other factors (such as shifts in
investor sentiment or liquidity shocks). Analysts can distinguish between these two potential
drivers of stock returns, but the market does not fully take into account the information
(or lack thereof) analysts provide. In support of this hypothesis, I nd that price events
accompanied by analyst reports are more positively correlated with future earnings than no-
information price events. When earnings surprises are measured by abnormal returns, this
positive correlation holds only for information-based price shocks. When earnings surprises
are measured using analyst forecasts or the seasonal randomwalk model, the relation holds for
both types of price movements, but is signicantly stronger for information-based ones. These
results suggest analysts can determine whether a price shock was caused by fundamental
news about the rm, and are consistent with the view that post-event momentum is based
on gradual incorporation of such news into prices.
To test this hypothesis further, I explore how the content of analyst reports inuences
their impact on post-event returns. I nd that momentum exists only when analysts agree
with the direction of the price change (i.e., when analyst recommendations are positive for a
price increase or negative for a price decrease). If analysts disagree with it, the price change
is actually followed by a reversal. This result suggests that the content of analyst reports
matters, and it is not the case that reports only represent a sun-spot coordination device
for investors.4 This test illustrates an important advantage that my approach has over other
4I thank the referee for pointing out this potential alternative explanation.
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studies (discussed below) utilizing media-based measures of information: it is much easier to
determine whether the information was positive or negative with analyst reports.
A number of behavioral models try to explain momentum and reversals, either by grouping
investors into those acting on private information and those trading on momentum (Hong
and Stein, 1999) or by assuming investor behavior is driven by behavioral biases (Daniel,
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998). Brav and
Heaton (2002) show that (the appearance of) overreaction and underreaction can arise even
with fully rational investors if they only possess incomplete information about the structure of
the economy. Broadly speaking, these models all predict that investors underreact to relevant
new information about a rm, which is consistent with my results. While my ndings do
not distinguish between theories based on investor irrationality or on rational structural
uncertainty, they are less supportive of models relying on asymmetric information (Tetlock,
2010) combined with persistent liquidity shocks (though in this case, there are no reversals,
just more or less momentum). Since asymmetric information is presumably always reduced
when news is released, these theories, at least in their simplest form, do not predict di¤erential
outcomes based on whether analysts agree or disagree with the direction of the price change.
Interestingly, positive price shocks outnumber negative ones by close to 40%, and this
di¤erence is fully driven by no-information price events. This is a somewhat surprising
result, given the conventional view that analysts prefer issuing positive news, in which case
they should be more likely to comment on positive price changes. One possible explanation
is short sales constraints, which could make it harder for arbitrageurs to counteract positive
no-information price shocks than negative ones. In support of this view, I nd that for no-
information price shocks the magnitude of the average increase exceeds that of the average
decline, whereas for information-based price shocks the opposite is true.
The ratio of no-information to information-based price events is strongly correlated with
average aggregate implied volatility, with an intriguing potential implication that during
periods of high uncertainty, the relative importance of news about rm-specic fundamentals
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falls relative to other shocks to stock prices. Furthermore, I nd that this ratio predicts future
momentum prots in an economically very meaningful way. The relation is especially strong
in the second half of my sample, where a one standard deviation increase in the (quarterly)
ratio forecasts a 5.9% decline in quarterly momentum returns, with an R2 of 32.3%. This
result suggests that the phenomena documented in this paper play a signicant role in the
protability of price momentum, and are consistent with theories that attribute momentum
to investor underreaction to new information.
The research approach in this paper is most similar to that of Pritamani and Singal
(2001), Chan (2003), and Tetlock (2010). Pritamani and Singal (2001) study a subset of New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (Amex) stocks that experienced
large price changes between 1990 and 1992. Conditional on a public announcement or volume
increase associated with the event, these stocks exhibit momentum.5 Chan (2003) constructs
an index of news headlines for a random subset of Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) stocks, and nds momentum after news and reversal after no news, with the e¤ect
mostly driven by loser stocks. Tetlock (2010) uses the entire daily Dow Jones news archive
from 1979 to 2007 to study how presence of public news a¤ects subsequent returns. He
nds that reversals are signicantly lower after news days and that for many stocks, volume-
induced momentum exists only on these days. Generally, these results are consistent with
my own. However, this paper is the only one that documents both momentum after news
and reversals after no-news, with the ndings holding equally for winners and losers and not
restricted to small stocks. Moreover, the magnitudes are signicantly greater than those in
previous work, conrming this is an important economic phenomenon, perhaps unlikely to
be explained purely by asymmetric information (Kim and Verrecchia, 1991; Tetlock, 2010).
To compare my results directly to those in Chan (2003), I merge my data set with the
headline news data set from that paper.6 Using headlines as a proxy for information, I nd
5Other papers analyzing stock returns after big price shocks include Brown, Harlow, and Tinic (1988),
Atkins and Dyl (1990), Bremer and Sweeney (1991), Cox and Peterson (1994), and Park (1995).
6I am extremely thankful to the editor, William Schwert, the referee, and Wesley Chan for sharing this
data.
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strong reversals after no-information price events, but no momentum after information-based
ones.7 The latter are actually also followed by reversals, though the e¤ect is substantially
weaker than after no-information price moves. When I include both information proxies,
the reversal e¤ect disappears for information-based events. Thus, while both headlines and
analyst reports seem to capture the same general phenomenon, the latter represent a more
powerful measure of whether a price change is accompanied by new signicant information,
which is perhaps not surprising given the di¤erent roles played by general media and stock
analysts. To the extent that analyst reports focus more on news about fundamentals than
newspapers, it seems that investors underreact most to this type of news.
The second contribution of this paper is to examine whether analyst recommendations
convey useful information to investors. A large literature shows that recommendations result
in signicant contemporaneous stock price reactions,8 and that investors can prot by trad-
ing on recommendations even after they are released.9 More recently, Altinkilic and Hansen
(2009) dispute both sets of results, arguing that they stem from analyststendency to pig-
gyback on corporate news.10 Chen, Francis, and Schipper (2005) nd that a typical analyst
report does not produce a price reaction that is higher than the average on days without
reports. Loh and Stulz (2011) report that the majority of analyst recommendations are not
informative, but they also show that recommendations of a subset of analysts persistently
impact stock prices.
My ndings provide new evidence that analysts produce relevant information. Even if
their recommendations do not directly inuence prices, analysts seem to be able to distinguish
between di¤erent large price movements, identifying those that signal future drift. One
7This is not inconsistent with the results in Chan (2003), which also does not document news-based
momentum over the horizons studied in my paper.
8See Davies and Canes (1978), Elton, Gruber, and Grossman (1986), Beneish (1991), Stickel (1995),
Womack (1996), Francis and So¤er (1997), Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2004), Ivkovic and Jegadeesh
(2004), and Asquith, Mikhail, and Au (2005).
9See Stickel (1995), Womack (1996), Michaely and Womack (1999), Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and
Trueman (2001), Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004), and Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2004).
10Womack (1996) and Asquith, Mikhail, and Au (2005) also nd that most reports do not o¤er new
information or occur simultaneously with other important news.
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interpretation of this evidence is that analysts recognize which price events are caused by
news about rm fundamentals and which ones stem from other factors (such as shifts in
investor sentiment or liquidity shocks). Consistent with this hypothesis, I show that price
events accompanied by analyst reports predict future earnings better than no-information
price events, while Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) nd that momentum in stock returns is
stronger for stocks with low analyst coverage.11 I also nd that the relation between analyst
recommendations and post-event returns does not change after the enactment of Regulation
Fair Disclosure, suggesting that at least some analyst skills are not dependent on access to
privileged information sources.
Finally, this paper could add to the literature on investor attention. Most of this work ar-
gues that limited investor attention causes underreaction (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; DellaV-
igna and Pollet, 2007, 2009), which leads to drift in stock prices.12 My ndings suggest that
limited attention may not always lead to underreaction. Insofar as the presence of analyst
reports represents a proxy for whether investors take note of a large price move, I show that
stock prices can actually overreact when investors are paying less attention.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes my methodology,
outlines how I construct my sample, and denes all the variables. Section 3 presents my
ndings, and Section 4 concludes.
2. Data and methodology
2.1. Methodology
My basic approach is straightforward. I classify stocks that experience major price shocks
into two groups: those where the price change is accompanied by new information and those
11Analysts also sometimes respond slowly to past news, especially for poorly performing stocks (Chan,
Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok, 1996).
12Some examples of this e¤ect include earnings announcements occurring outside of trading hours (Francis,
Pagach, and Stephan, 1992), on Fridays (DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009), or at the same times as announce-
ments of other rms (Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh, 2009). Post-announcement drift is also stronger when the
announcement is not covered in theWall Street Journal (Peress, 2008) and for low-volume stocks (Hou, Peng,
and Xiong, 2009).
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where it is not. As my proxy for information, I use recommendation-issuing analyst reports.
These reports could indicate that analysts believe an event occurred that is signicant enough
to warrant a comment. Alternatively, analyst activity itself could be the cause of the markets
reaction. Current evidence shows that both of these are possible scenarios, as analysts are
both sources of new information and interpreters of already released information (Asquith,
Mikhail, and Au, 2005; Altinkilic and Hansen, 2009). For the purposes of my analysis, either
of the cases qualies as an information-based event, since I am interested in any relevant
publicly available information about the rm, regardless of its source. While any proxy for
information is imperfect, analyst recommendations satisfy two important criteria for such a
proxy. First, they are very frequently newsworthy, at least in the eyes of investors.13 Second,
for actively covered stocks, analysts are likely to comment on most events that signicantly
a¤ects investorsview of a rms prospects.
2.2. Sample construction
The sample studied in this paper consists of stocks that are actively covered by sell-side
analysts and experience large price changes. I get information on analyst coverage from
the Institutional BrokersEstimate System (IBES) Recommendations database, which doc-
uments analyst recommendations issued by brokerage or research houses. Each observation
in the database corresponds to a recommendation by a specic house for a particular rm.
These recommendations can take the form of upgrades, downgrades, reiterations, or initial-
izations of coverage. The period covered by the database begins in November 1993 and ends
in December 2009.
The rst step in constructing my sample narrows the universe of all stocks in IBES to
only those that had at least ve recommendation-issuing analyst reports published over the
previous 12 months. The goal behind imposing this screen is to ensure that all the rms in the
sample are adequately followed by analysts. My methodology relies on the presence of analyst
13See Davies and Canes (1978), Elton, Gruber, and Grossman (1986), Beneish (1991), Stickel (1995),
Womack (1996), Francis and So¤er (1997), Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2004), Ivkovic and Jegadeesh
(2004), and Asquith, Mikhail, and Au (2005).
8
reports as an indicator of whether a signicant price movement is based on information. This
approach is obviously not valid for stocks with no or very sparse coverage, as in those cases
there are simply no analysts to write a report, even if the event causing the market reaction
is a new development crucial to the rms prospects. The threshold I employ is admittedly
arbitrary, but my results are robust to various di¤erent treatments.14 To allow for enough
time for a history of published reports to build up, my sample starts in 1995 and ends in
2009.15
The next step is to identify major price movements. I calculate a rms abnormal return,
dened as its daily return (Ri;t) in excess of its return predicted by the Fama-French three-
factor plus momentum model (Ri;t), and dene as a signicant price movement any rm-
date observation where the absolute value of this number,
Ri;t  Ri;t, exceeds 10%. This
threshold should be high enough to screen out most price movements that do not reect either
substantial changes in fundamentals (or market perception thereof) or in investor sentiment,
dened by Shleifer (2000, pp. 11-12) as "beliefs based on heuristics rather than Bayesian
rationality." Atkins and Dyl (1990) and Bremer and Sweeney (1991) both use the 10% number
in their studies of stock performance following large price declines. My results are robust to
di¤erent thresholds, both higher and lower, and to di¤erent methods of adjusting returns,
such as raw returns, market-adjusted returns, market-model excess returns, or Fama-French
three-factor model excess returns.16
Some more recent literature studying signicant price events (e.g., Pritamani and Singal,
2001) uses returns scaled by volatilities instead of absolute thresholds. The logic behind this
approach is that what constitutes a signicant price change is di¤erent for high-volatility
stocks than for low-volatility stocks. However, return volatility is not exogenous. It reects
the industry a rm operates in and the degree to which investor sentiment or liquidity shocks
14The papers ndings do not change regardless of whether I use a higher or lower threshold. They also
remain the same if I replace the number of reports issued with the number of analysts covering the stock.
15The analyst coverage screen could make it harder to detect momentum, given the result in Hong, Lim,
and Stein (2000) that momentum is stronger for stocks with low analyst coverage.
16These ndings, and all subsequent untabulated ones, are available upon request.
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a¤ect trading activity in the stock. For example, Internet stocks in the late 1990s were
extremely volatile, at least partly due to the inuence of shifting investor sentiment, which
makes those stocks of particular interest for my analysis. If I adjusted their returns to take
into account their high volatility, I would lose many observations where signicant changes in
fundamentals or investor sentiment occurred. Absolute thresholds do mean that my sample
is biased towards highly volatile stocks, but again, those stocks might be the ones I am more
interested in in the rst place. In any case, this assumption is not crucial for my ndings, all
of which continue to hold if I scale returns by their lagged volatility.
I obtain data on daily stock returns, rm size, and trading volume from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and annual accounting data from the CRSP/Compustat
merged database. Earnings announcement dates are collected from Compustat. NYSE size
breakpoints come from Kenneth Frenchs Web site.
The nal sample ("Full sample") is made up of all rm-trading day observations that
satisfy both the analyst coverage and the major price movement criteria, which amounts to
166,470 data points. My sample size greatly exceeds that of samples used in other studies
of large price movements. For example, the sample in Pritamani and Singal (2001) contains
4,873 observations. I further divide the Full sample into four subsamples, based on the
direction of the price change and on whether an analyst report was released around the price
event. I classify a price movement as accompanied by an analyst report if at least one is
published on the day the movement occurred, a trading day before, or a trading day after. I
broaden the window beyond the price event day itself because the timing of reports does not
always correspond to the market reaction. For instance, if a company reports earnings after
the market closes, analysts might react that day, while investors will only be able to do so
the next trading day. Sometimes analysts actually precipitate a price movement by issuing a
report, and this again might take place when the market already closed for the day. I allow
analysts to issue a report after the price event to give them more time to react. The resulting
four subsamples are:
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i. "Reported negative sample" which consists of all negative price events accompanied by
one or more analyst reports (17,566 observations).
ii. "Unreported negative sample" which consists of all negative price events unaccompa-
nied by analyst reports (52,666 observations).
iii. "Reported positive sample" which consists of all positive price events accompanied by
one or more analyst reports (17,056 observations).
iv. "Unreported positive sample" which consists of all positive price events unaccompanied
by analyst reports (79,182 observations).
Table 1 shows the time-series distribution of these observations. One fact that immedi-
ately jumps out is the clustering of observations in the middle part and in the last two years
of my sample. The 19982002 period makes up only 33% of the Full sample when measured
in years, but represents 58% of its observations. The last two years, when the nancial cri-
sis was raging, account for 20% of observations and only 13% of years. This clustering is
driven mostly by increases in the volatility of stock returns. One can observe this in Table
2, which presents the total number of CRSP stocks, signicant price movements (using the
10% criterion), and recommendation-issuing analyst reports by year. While the total number
of stocks changes over time (rst increasing and then decreasing), these changes are much
less pronounced than the changes in the number of large price events. The clustering could
potentially complicate my analysis, but my research methodology takes the problem into
account (both in the regression framework and in portfolio construction).
[Tables 1 and 2 about here.]
2.3. Variable denitions
Book equity is computed as in Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003). I assume markets
get access to nancial statement information four months after the scal year ends.17 I use
17The Securities and Exchange Commission used to require that rms under its jurisdiction le their 10-K
reports within 90 days of scal year-end. This rule changed recently (the deadline was shortened to 75 days
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the nancial statement data that reect the latest information available to the public. Book-
to-market ratio is computed using the previous months closing market price. Firm size is
calculated using the closing market price one trading day before the event day. Trading
volume is computed as the percentage of shares outstanding that is traded. All returns are
cumulative, but my results do not change if I use buy-and-hold returns instead. Momentum is
calculated as the return over the previous 12 months. If there are less than six valid monthly
returns over that period, the momentum variable is set to missing.
I estimate abnormal returns using a four-factor model, consisting of three Fama-French
factors (Fama and French, 1993) plus a momentum factor (Carhart, 1997). More speci-
cally, for each rm-trading day observation, I use pre-event returns to estimate the following
regression model:
Ri;t  Rf;t = + i;m(Rm;t  Rf;t) + i;smbSMBt + i;hmlHMLt + i;umdUMDt + ui;t; (1)
where Ri is the rms daily return, Rm is the market return (CRSP value-weighted), Rf is
the risk-free rate, SMB is the return of a portfolio of small stocks minus the return of a
portfolio of big stocks (size factor), HML is the return of a portfolio of high book-to-market
stocks minus the return of a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks (value factor), and UMD
is the return of a portfolio of winner stocks minus the return of a portfolio of loser stocks
(momentum factor). The factor returns are obtained from Kenneth Frenchs Web site, which
also provides more details on their construction. I estimate the model by ordinary least
squares (OLS) regressions for a 255 trading day-period starting 31 trading days before the
event day. I require at least 30 data points before I use the resulting coe¢ cients. Otherwise,
I delete the observation from my sample. With the coe¢ cients obtained from Eq. (1), I then
compute post-event abnormal returns (AR) as:
in 2004 for most rms and then to 60 days in 2006 for large rms), but was in e¤ect during most of my
sample period. I add an extra month to account for late lers.
12
ARi;t = (Ri;t  Rf;t) 







Table 3 presents summary statistics for the Full sample and the various subsamples.
There are substantially more no-information price events than information-based ones, with
the ratio of the former to the latter being close to 4:1. Even for actively covered stocks, the
majority of major price movements are not associated with a recommendation-issuing report.
Presuming analyst reports are a valid proxy for new information released to investors, this
shows that there are other important drivers of stock returns. I do not attempt to directly
identify these drivers, but possible candidates include private information, shifts in investor
sentiment, and liquidity shocks. This nding conrms previous work showing that publicly
available information cannot fully explain stock market gyrations.18
[Table 3 about here.]
Interestingly, positive price shocks outnumber negative ones by 37%, with all of the di¤er-
ence stemming from no-information price events. Consequently, the ratio of no-information
to information-based price shocks is much higher for positive price jumps (4.6 for positive
changes versus 3.0 for negative ones). This result is especially surprising given the argu-
ments that analysts, for a variety of reasons (including preserving access to management
and winning investment banking business for their employers), prefer discussing or issuing
18There is little or no relation between news and aggregate market returns (Schwert, 1981; Mitchell and
Mulherin, 1994). Macroeconomic variables explain less than half of the variance in aggregate stock prices, and
large market movements often do not coincide with new information of corresponding importance (Cutler,
Poterba, and Summers, 1989). For individual rms, a model that includes aggregate economic developments,
industry e¤ects, and rm-specic news explains only a fraction of daily and monthly return variance (Roll,
1988). Volatility of stock returns is much too high to be explained just by changes in dividends (Shiller, 1981),
and even after controlling for information release, returns are more volatile during market hours (French and
Roll, 1986).
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positive news. A combination of liquidity shocks or shifting investor sentiment and short
sales constraints provides one possible explanation. When a stock suddenly drops with no
new information coming out, arbitrageurs may start buying it and so ameliorate the ultimate
decrease. Faced with a price increase, arbitrageurs may nd it harder to react in a similar
fashion because of short sales constraints, resulting in a bigger price jump.19 Providing fur-
ther support for this hypothesis, I nd that for no-information price shocks, the magnitude
of the average increase exceeds that of the average decrease, while the opposite is true for
information-based price shocks.
Measured by market equity, rms with information-based price moves are signicantly
larger. One interpretation is that private signals or shifts in investor sentiment are more
important determinants of stock returns for smaller rms. Alternatively, analyst reports
might represent a better public information proxy for larger rms. Analyst coverage is
positively correlated with size, and analysts might also be more likely to react to developments
a¤ecting a larger rm. As support for this hypothesis, rms that experience no-information
price shocks have less analyst coverage, with an average of 10.4 reports published over the
previous year versus 14.3 for rms that experience information-based price shocks. The
latter type of price moves is also accompanied by higher trading volume, perhaps because
more investors trade when new public information about a rm comes out. This result is
consistent with theoretical models of asymmetric information in trading, such as Kim and
Verrecchia (1991) and Tetlock (2010).
For the purposes of this paper, the most relevant observation here concerns post-event
returns. These depend both on the direction of the price shock and on its information status.
After a price decline, the average cumulative abnormal return over a 20-trading day horizon
is 0.7% if it was information-based and 7.2% if it was not. At rst glance, it appears that
stocks experiencing negative price shocks accompanied by information severely underperform
those where no information is released. This pattern is reversed for price increases. Over
19Arbitrageurs would not try to trade in the opposite direction of information-based price moves, as those
are followed by drift.
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a 20-trading day horizon, the average abnormal return after a positive price shock is -0.1%
if it is information-based and -0.4% if it is not. The evidence here is consistent with the
hypothesis that post-event returns depend on whether the price shock is accompanied by
information. The next step is to test more rigorously whether information presence really
a¤ects post-event returns.
3.2. Regression analysis of post-event returns
I start by examining what factors determine post-event returns. My dependent variable
is the cumulative abnormal return over holding periods ranging between ve and 40 trading
days (ARm;n). The main focus of my analysis is the impact of event day abnormal return
(AR0), but I also include various control variables, resulting in the following specication:
ARm;n = + AR0 + 
0X + u: (3)
X is a set of explanatory variables other than the event day return, which includes log size
(log(ME)), log book-to-market ratio (log(BE=ME)), return over the previous 12 months
(mom), and trading volume (vol). Size, book-to-market, and momentum are well-known
predictors of the cross-section of stock returns (Fama and French, 1992, 1993; Jegadeesh
and Titman, 1993). Lee and Swaminathan (2000) nd that trading volume can help recon-
cile shorter-term underreaction to longer-term overreaction in stock returns, while Conrad,
Hameed, and Niden (1994) show that stocks with low trading volume actually experience
drift over weekly horizons.
To estimate Eq. (3), I employ the weighted least squares (WLS) approach. Each cross-
section is weighted equally, in a similar manner to the eponymous method proposed by Fama
and MacBeth (1973), which means I assign each rm-trading day observation a weight equal
to the inverse of the number of rms in the corresponding cross-section. This approach is
the same as the one applied by Vuolteenaho (2002). I opt for WLS because my panel is
unbalanced, but my results remain unaltered if I instead use OLS. t-Statistics are calculated
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using clustered (Rogers) standard errors (Rogers, 1983, 1993), where each trading day rep-
resents one cluster.20 Alternative methods for addressing cross-sectional correlation, such
as the Fama-MacBeth procedure, do not change any of the papers ndings. The same is
the case if my clustered standard errors reect both potential cross-sectional and time-series
correlation.
Panel A in Table 4 presents coe¢ cient estimates for the Full sample. My discussion will
focus on the case in which the dependent variable is the abnormal return over a 20-trading
day holding period, but the results are substantially the same for all other horizons. The
coe¢ cient of most interest is the one on the event day return, which is negative and sta-
tistically very signicant (t-stat=-7.1). This indicates that stocks with major price shocks
unconditionally experience reversals. The coe¢ cient magnitude of -0.081 implies that about
8% of the event day move is reversed over a 20-trading day holding period. The size coef-
cient is negative (t-stat=-18.7), the book-to-market one is positive (t-stat=8.1), and the
momentum one is negative (t-stat=-20.3). The coe¢ cient on volume is negative, but its
economic signicance is not very high and it is barely statistically signicant (t-stat=-2.1).
[Table 4 about here.]
The previous results pool together stocks with large information-based price movements
and stocks with no-information price movements. Now I test whether post-event returns di¤er
across the two groups. Panel B in Table 4 shows coe¢ cient estimates when only price events
unaccompanied by analyst reports are considered. The event day return coe¢ cient is more
negative than before, equaling -0.108 (t-stat=-6.8). The coe¢ cients on size, book-to-market,
momentum, and volume are about the same as before. Panel C reports coe¢ cient estimates
when only price events accompanied by at least one analyst report are included. The major
di¤erences are that the event day return coe¢ cient is no longer signicant (t-stat=-1.2) and is
20I choose clustered standard errors because, unlike regular standard errors, they reect any cross-sectional
correlation of the residuals across stocks, which can make the former signicantly biased downwards. Clus-
tered standard errors will be unbiased as long as the number of clusters is su¢ ciently large. With its 3,040
clusters, my sample easily satises this criterion. Using a simulation, Petersen (2009) nds that 500 clusters
is enough to make clustered standard errors correct.
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about ten times smaller in magnitude than the point estimate for no-information price events.
Unlike stocks experiencing no-information price shocks, stocks with information-based ones
do not exhibit reversals.
An alternative specication for testing the impact of information includes a dummy vari-
able indicating whether information accompanies a price shock. I use the following regression:
ARm;n = + AR0 + (AR0  un) + 0X + "(AR0  vol) + u: (4)
un is a dummy variable set to one if no analyst reports were published around the event
day and to zero otherwise. I add an interaction term between volume and event day re-
turn because previous research shows price momentum or shocks predict returns di¤erently
conditional on volume (Lee and Swaminathan, 2000; Pritamani and Singal, 2001; Llorente,
Michaely, Saar, and Wang, 2002; Tetlock, 2010).
Coe¢ cient estimates for Eq. (4) are presented in Table 5. Panel A gives results for the
Full sample. The coe¢ cient of most interest is the one on the interaction term AR0  un,
which is negative and both economically and statistically signicant (t-stat=-7.0). With
the interaction term included, the event day return coe¢ cient actually becomes positive and
statistically signicant (t-stat=2.7). Information presence appears to be a key determinant of
post-event performance. While no-information stocks experience large reversals (amounting
to 9.6% of the initial price shock), information ones do not and even exhibit drift. Another
interesting nding is that the interaction term AR0  vol is not signicant (t-stat=-1.4).
One possible reconciliation of this nding with previous results is that volume reects new
information, and once this aspect is controlled for, volume ceases to be important.
[Table 5 about here.]
Interestingly, the strength of the signal provided (or proxied for) by analyst reports does
not seem to depend on their number. In unreported tests, I show that the number of analyst
reports that come out around a price shock has no impact on subsequent returns (controlling
for whether any reports were issued at all).
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The rest of Table 5 provides various robustness checks. One potential complication re-
garding my general approach is the bid-ask bounce e¤ect. Some prior studies claim that
reversals stem, at least in part, from this very microstructure issue (Atkins and Dyl, 1990;
Cox and Peterson, 1994; Park, 1995). More broadly, as a result of transactions costs such as
spreads, any trading strategy trying to take advantage of (and so arbitrage away) di¤eren-
tial post-event performance of information and no-information stocks could be unprotable.
Both the bid-ask bounce and transactions costs should most a¤ect small, illiquid stocks.
Consequently, I attempt to lessen the inuence of microstructure e¤ects by excluding such
stocks from my sample.
In Panel B, I re-run regression (4) for rms whose closing stock price one day before
the event day is higher than $5. With this restriction, the number of observations drops
by 40%, indicating that (potentially) illiquid stocks make up a nontrivial but not dominant
portion of my sample. Firms that experience no-information price shocks still experience
reversals, as the coe¢ cient on the interaction term remains negative (t-stat=-5.9), and the
ones with information-based price changes exhibit drift (t-stat=3.2). The importance of the
size coe¢ cient is somewhat diminished, but it continues to be signicant (t-stat=-2.5). These
ndings continue to hold when I replace a price screen with a size screen in Panel C, which
is limited to stocks with market capitalization above the NYSE bottom decile breakpoint.
Regardless of the exact method used, once I eliminate stocks most subject to microstruc-
ture e¤ects, information-based price shocks are followed by drift and no-information ones
by reversals. The fact that the AR0 coe¢ cient becomes more positive (indicating stronger
momentum after information-based price shocks) also supports the hypothesis that some of
the post-event reversal after large price movements can be attributed to the bid-ask bounce
e¤ect.
Another way to reduce the impact of the bid-ask bounce e¤ect is to introduce a lag
between the event day and the rst day of the holding period. Panel D presents coe¢ cient
estimates when post-event returns are computed with a one trading day lag. The interaction
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term coe¢ cient is again negative (t-stat=-3.7), although its magnitude decreases somewhat
relative to the no-lag case. This again suggests that the bid-ask bounce might play a role in
the observed reversals after no-information price shocks, but, even if that were the case, it
explains a relatively small part.
In Panel E, I restrict the sample to price events that do not occur around earnings
announcements. Prior work (Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 1990) shows strong short-term
drift associated with these announcements, where positive (negative) earnings surprises lead
to positive (negative) returns. Analyst reports are more likely to be released at times when
rms are issuing earnings reports, so the post-earnings announcement drift phenomenon could
explain my result that news-based price events are followed by drift. However, the event day
return coe¢ cient is still positive (t-stat=2.4) even when I exclude earnings announcements,
while the AR0  un coe¢ cient is negative (t-stat=-6.9).
Panel F provides coe¢ cient estimates for price shocks associated with earnings announce-
ments. Only about 5% of observations fall into this category, showing that earnings an-
nouncements are not the dominant driver behind my ndings. A large majority of earnings
announcements coinciding with major price movements probably involve new information re-
leased to the market, even if no analyst reports are published. Analyst reports are an imper-
fect proxy for information release, and this subsample very likely includes many information-
based price events where, for whatever reason, no reports come out. This conjecture is
conrmed in the data. The coe¢ cient on the event day return is positive (t-stat=1.3) and
more than twice as large as the coe¢ cient in the no-earnings-announcement sample. The
interaction term is, on the other hand, no longer signicant (t-stat=-1.8). The coe¢ cient
magnitudes imply a 20-trading day horizon drift of about 6% of the event day return. The
nding should not be surprising, given that the post-earnings announcement drift is a very
well-documented phenomenon, but it also o¤ers additional support for the hypothesis that
post-event performance depends on whether a price shock is accompanied by information.
19
3.3. Portfolio analysis
The regression analysis presented above suggests that the presence of information (or lack
thereof) a¤ects post-event returns. Price shocks unaccompanied by information (as proxied
by analyst reports) are followed by signicant reversals, while information-based ones are
not. Next I test whether this potential anomaly leads to a protable trading strategy.
Each of the stocks in the Full sample is assigned to one of four portfolios depending on the
direction of the price move and its information status. The resulting portfolios are: Negative
no-information portfolio, which consists of stocks that su¤er a no-information price decline;
Negative information portfolio, which consists of stocks that su¤er an information-based
price decline; Positive no-information portfolio, which consists of stocks that enjoy a no-
information price increase; and Positive information portfolio, which consists of stocks that
enjoy an information-based price increase. At any point in time, these portfolios are made
up of all stocks that experienced the required price event over the previous N trading days,
where N depends on the specied holding period. A portfolios return is computed as an
equal-weighted average of the constituent stocksreturns. For example, with a 20-trading day
horizon, Positive information portfolios return on a given day is the equal-weighted average
return of all stocks that had a positive information-based price shock over the previous 20
trading days.
Using these portfolios, I then create two zero-investment portfolios, one each for no-
information and information-based price shocks, which go long losers and short winners. If
no-information price events are indeed followed by reversals, we would expect the former
portfolio to enjoy a positive abnormal return. If information-based price events are followed
by drift, we would expect the latter portfolio to su¤er a negative abnormal return. To test
these hypotheses, I use the time-series of returns for each long-short portfolio to estimate the
following regression:
Rport;t = port + 
0
portXt + uport;t; (5)
where Rport is a portfolios daily return and X is a set of factor portfolio returns, which
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includes the market excess return (Rm Rf), the size factor (SMB), the value factor (HML),
and the momentum factor (UMD). If the intercept term (alpha) is signicantly di¤erent from
zero, we can reject the null hypothesis of no abnormal return.21
Panel A in Table 6 reports coe¢ cient estimates for the no-information long-short port-
folio. I present results for the market model, the Fama-French three-factor model, and the
Fama-French three-factor plus momentum model. Neither the alphas magnitude nor signif-
icance level changes with the specication, showing that my ndings do not depend on the
choice of a particular asset pricing model.22 For a 20-trading day horizon, the no-information
long-short portfolio enjoys a positive abnormal return, which on an annualized basis equals
20.2% (t-stat=7.3).23 The positive intercept supports the hypothesis that price shocks not
based on information result in post-event reversals, and the strategy exploiting this phenom-
enon delivers extraordinary returns per unit of risk. Assuming independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) returns, the annualized Sharpe ratio is 1.66, which is much higher than
the markets (0.32), the value factors (0.39), or the momentum factors (0.40) over the same
period. The alpha remains positive and signicant over all other horizons. However, its
magnitude declines with the holding period, indicating that the degree of reversal following
no-information price shocks is more pronounced early after the event. The only consistently
signicant factor loading is the momentum one, which is negative but not economically im-
portant (always less than 0.1).
[Table 6 about here.]
Panel B then shows coe¢ cient estimates for the information-based long-short portfolio.
The alpha is now signicantly negative over all holding periods. For a 20-trading day horizon,
its magnitude implies an annualized abnormal return of -15.1% (t-stat=-4.1) and a Sharpe
21Given that the number of stocks constituting a portfolio varies over time, the error term in the regression
could be heteroskedastic. Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) apply simulation methods and nd that the resulting
heteroskedasticity does not impact signicance tests on the intercept term; consequently, I do not try to
correct for this.
22When I discuss statistical signicance, I always refer to t-statistics obtained from the Fama-French
three-factor plus momentum model.
23Assuming there are 252 trading days in a year and given the daily alpha in Table 6 of 0.0008, this
translates to: 252 * 0.0008 = 0.2016.
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ratio of -1.21. The negative intercept is consistent with the hypothesis that information-based
price shocks are followed by drift. As in Panel A, the alphas magnitude decreases with the
holding period, but this decline is much less severe than in that case. The momentum loading
is again the only signicant one, with a negative sign.
Finally, in Panel C I present abnormal returns for a trading strategy that exploits both
reversals after no-information price events and drift after information-based price events.
Over a 20-trading day horizon, the strategy yields an annualized abnormal return of 35.3%
(t-stat=8.2). This is obviously a very meaningful number economically, but the strategy
also requires frequent trading activity, which might limit its attractiveness or restrict its
application to those investors who can trade most cheaply. However, given the potential
prots, it is at least reasonable to conclude that substantial implementation costs would be
required to completely eliminate this opportunity.
The fact that in Panel A the magnitude of alpha decreases with the horizon suggests that
the bid-ask bounce might partly explain reversal after no-information price shocks. To explore
how important this e¤ect might be, in Tables 7 and 8 I repeat my analysis after excluding
rms with a stock price below $5 or with market capitalization below the NYSE bottom
decile breakpoint. My ndings remain unaltered in both cases. For the no-information
long-short portfolio, the intercept is signicantly positive over all but the longest holding
period. Even when stocks most subject to the bid-ask bounce are eliminated, major price
moves unaccompanied by information are still followed by reversals. The magnitude of the
intercept term is lower than previously, possibly revealing that this e¤ect does play a role
in my results. While the reversal phenomenon is weaker when price or size restrictions are
imposed, drift after information-based price shocks is actually stronger. The information-
based long-short portfolio su¤ers a negative abnormal return over all horizons, with an alpha
that is more negative than in Table 6.
[Tables 7 and 8 about here.]
In Table 9, I use value-weighted portfolios instead of equal-weighted ones. The only
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major change is that the no-information portfolio no longer has a positive alpha at the
longest horizons. The results for the information portfolio are actually stronger than in the
equal-weighted case. Combined with evidence in Tables 7 and 8, this shows that neither
reversals after no-news nor momentum after news are restricted to small stocks.
[Table 9 about here.]
In an unreported robustness test, I estimate Eq. (5) using WLS, where the weights are
given by the number of stocks in a portfolio at a given time. This method gives more weight
to those periods when the portfolios contain more stocks, which could be important given
that my price events are not distributed uniformly across time. This alternative approach
does not a¤ect any of my results.
3.4. Headline news
My ndings of momentum after information-based price moves and reversal after no-
information price moves are similar to those in Chan (2003), who relies on headline news
as a proxy for presence of information. More specically, he uses the Dow Jones Interactive
Publications Library to obtain all the dates when a stock is mentioned in a major daily
publication. Importantly, he does not include analyst reports in his study, ensuring there is
no direct overlap between our respective measures of information.24 The approach in Chan
(2003) is also quite di¤erent from mine, focusing on monthly returns and longer horizons.
At horizons that are comparable to those in this paper, he nds only weak evidence of drift
following news.
Given these di¤erences, it is not immediately possible to determine whether this paper and
Chan (2003) are capturing the same phenomena. To address these issues directly, I combine
the headline-news data set from Chan (2003) with my own. His sample covers approximately
one-quarter (randomly chosen) of all CRSP stocks over the 19802000 period, so I lose a
large number of observations in the merge process. The resulting subsample contains 11,877
price events between 1995 and 2000.
24Of course, it is possible that newspapers sometimes carry stories about just-published analyst reports.
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I now create an additional measure of information: a dummy variable unhead that equals
one if no headline news came out around a price event and zero otherwise. Unsurprisingly, the
two measures of information (analyst reports and headline news) are highly correlated. The
unconditional probability of headline news occurring around a major price move is 56%. If
a price event is accompanied by analyst reports, the probability increases to 81%. Similarly,
the unconditional probability of an analyst report being issued around a price shock is 19%,
which rises to 28% in the presence of headline news. These numbers also show that headline
news is much more common than analyst reports, at least on the days when signicant price
moves occur.25
[Table 10 about here.]
In Panel A of Table 10, I present coe¢ cient estimates for Eq. (4) with the headline news
variable replacing the one based on analyst reports (unan). The interaction term coe¢ cient
AR0  unhead is strongly negative and signicant over all horizons, mirroring the results
obtained using my analyst-based measure. With either measure, no-news price events are
followed by reversals. However, for headline news, in contrast to analyst reports, reversals also
happen after news-based price moves, with the event day coe¢ cient always being negative
and signicant. With headline news as a proxy, reversals are observed for both types of
price events, though they are signicantly stronger after no-news moves. Table 11 conrms
this result in calendar time. Both the no-information and the information-based portfolios
experience reversals, and the e¤ect is much stronger for the former.
[Table 11 about here.]
In Panel B of Table 10, I add my unan dummy variable to the regression specication,
interacting it as before with the event day return. The event day coe¢ cient is now no
longer signicant, showing that, unlike price moves accompanied by headline news, price
moves based on new analyst-originated information do not experience reversals. As in my
previous tests, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term AR0unan is negative. Interestingly, the
25As with the analyst report-based measure, the ratio of no-information to information-based price shocks
is higher for positive price jumps (0.83 for positive changes versus 0.70 for negative ones).
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AR0unhead coe¢ cient does not change much. Its magnitude drops somewhat, but it remains
strongly negative. It seems that both analyst reports and headline news independently reect
new information, and that the absence of such information results in bigger reversals of
signicant price moves.
Earnings announcements represent another potential information source for investors. In
Panel C, I introduce a dummy variable (noann) that equals one if the price event did not
coincide with an earnings announcement and zero otherwise. This addition does not change
any of my results. The coe¢ cients on both AR0  unhead and AR0  unan remain negative
and signicant. Interestingly, the AR0 noann interaction coe¢ cient is not signicant, which
suggests that earnings announcements do not impact post-event returns once one controls
for analyst reports and headline news. However, an important caveat here is that my sample
is restricted to stocks actively covered by analysts, which makes it unlikely that an earnings
announcement associated with a large price move would pass without comment by either
analysts or news media (there are only 157 such earnings announcements in the 19952000
period).
Analyst reports typically focus on various fundamental performance metrics, such as
earnings per share and revenues. Newspaper articles, on the other hand, frequently discuss
other topics that are perhaps less germane to a rms future prospects, but may still attract
the attention of investors. My ndings here suggest that investors underreact more to new
information about fundamentals, despite such information perhaps being more relevant for
future rm performance (which I show below).
3.5. Analyst report content
In addition to being focused on fundamentals, another advantage of analyst reports is
that it is relatively easy to determine whether they contain good or bad news about a rm.
This information can be helpful in distinguishing between various theories of momentum
and reversals. One interpretation of my results so far is that investors underreact to new
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rm-specic fundamental information and overreact to other shocks to stock prices (such as
liquidity shocks or changes in investor sentiment). Analysts can di¤erentiate between these
various drivers of stock returns, which is why they sometimes issue reports around signicant
stock price changes and sometimes do not.
If this explanation is correct, the content of analyst reports should matter. Or, more
specically, what should matter is whether analysts "agree" with the direction of the price
move. If a rms stock price rises (drops), but the new information is actually negative
(positive), we would not expect to observe subsequent momentum. Instead, we should see
reversals.
A straightforward measure of an analyst reports informational content is simply its rec-
ommendation. If an analyst upgrades (downgrades) his recommendations, I classify the
resulting report as positive (negative) news. If there is no change or coverage is just initi-
ated, the news is neutral. For each price event, I sum up recommendation changes across
all reports issued around it, and use this aggregate recommendation change as my measure.
I rely on the standardized Strong buy/Buy/Hold/Sell/Strong sell classication scheme used
by IBES, and take into account not only the direction of recommendation changes but also
their magnitude (e.g., an upgrade from Hold to Strong buy counts for more than an upgrade
from Buy to Strong buy).26
I restrict my analysis to only information-based price events, and dene two dummy
variables that reect whether a price move is accompanied by supporting or conicting analyst
recommendations. Agree equals one if the aggregate change in analyst recommendations is
of the same sign as the event day price move and zero otherwise. Disagree equals one if the
aggregate change in analyst recommendations is of the opposite sign as the event day price
move and zero otherwise. Importantly, analysts do reasonably frequently disagree with the
direction of the price shock: 18% of their recommendations have the opposite sign (and 55%
have the same sign).
26Strong buy/Buy/Hold/Sell/Strong sell scheme translates into numerical rankings of 2/1/0/-1/-2.
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To examine the impact of analyst report content, I estimate the following regression:
ARm;n = +AR0+
agree(AR0agree)+dis(AR0disagree)+0X+"(AR0vol)+u: (6)
Table 12 presents the results. The key terms of interest are AR0  agree and AR0 
disagree. The rst one is positive (t-stat=2.6 for a 10-day horizon), showing that momentum
is stronger if analyst recommendations agree with the direction of the event day price change.
In contrast, the second term is negative (t-stat=-3.6 for a 10-day horizon). When analyst
reports contradict a price change, it is followed by reversal. Finally, when analyst reports
convey neutral news (i.e., when there is no net change in analyst recommendations), I nd
neither drift nor reversals after a price event. These ndings are broadly consistent with
behavioral theories of momentum and reversals, which rely on investors underreacting to
certain new information (in this case, the content of analyst reports).
[Table 12 about here.]
They are less consistent with theories based on asymmetric information (combined with
persistent liquidity shocks for informed investors), where momentum ensues after the degree
of informational asymmetry is reduced (Tetlock, 2010). Since analyst reports presumably help
disseminate new information regardless of whether they agree or disagree with the direction
of a price move, the asymmetric information theories do not predict a di¤erential response
depending on analyst report content, contrary to what I nd in the data. My results also
do not support the theory that analyst reports represent a sun-spot coordination mechanism
for investors, who ignore their content and simply trade in the direction of the price change.
3.6. Price shocks and future earnings
What kind of information do analyst reports issued around large-move days provide? If
analysts can distinguish between major price changes that are caused by news about funda-
mentals and those related to other shocks, one would expect information-based price events
to be stronger predictors of future rm performance than no-information ones. Moreover,
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such price moves should be positively correlated with future performance.
As my measure of rm performance, I use earnings announcements for the subsequent two
quarters. To ensure the price shock itself is not directly caused by an earnings announcement,
I limit my analysis to earnings announcements occurring at least one week after the price
event. I compute earnings surprises (EarnSur) employing three di¤erent approaches. First,
I calculate abnormal announcement returns using the Fama-French plus momentum model
over a three-day window starting one day before the announcement and ending one day
after. The announcement dates come from Compustat. Second, I calculate standardized
unexpected earnings (SUEs) using analyst forecasts, which are dened as the actual earnings
per share (EPS) minus the median analyst EPS forecast, scaled by the standard deviation
of analyst forecasts. Analyst forecasts come from IBES. Finally, I calculate SUEs using a
seasonal random model, where an SUE equals actual EPS minus EPS in the same quarter of
the previous year, scaled by the standard deviation of earnings surprises.
In Table 13, I estimate the following regression, which is similar to the specication in
Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008):
EarnSur = + AR0 + (AR0  un) + 0X + "(AR0  vol) + u: (7)
If information-based price events are positively correlated with future earnings, the event
day return coe¢ cient should be positive. If such price events are better predictors of earnings
than no-information ones, the interaction term AR0  un should be negative. Both of these
hypotheses are conrmed by the data. The AR0 coe¢ cient is positive and signicant for all
three surprise measures in the rst quarter following the price event and also for both SUE
measures in the second quarter. The interaction term is always negative and also signicant
in all but two cases. The magnitudes show that only information-based price changes are
positively correlated with future announcement returns. For SUEs, the positive correlation
holds for both types of price shocks, but is signicantly stronger for the ones accompanied
by analyst reports.
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[Table 13 about here.]
My results here show that price shocks predict future earnings (with a positive sign), and
that the relation is always stronger for information-based price shocks than for no-information
price shocks. In other words, a given positive (negative) price move predicts a higher (lower)
earnings surprise if it is accompanied by analyst reports. These ndings are consistent with
the hypothesis that analysts are able to identify price shocks caused by news about changes
in fundamentals (or that their reports reveal the changes), and that post-event momentum is
based on gradual incorporation of such news into prices. To the extent that investors follow
analyst recommendations (and in the process move stock prices), they do so at least in part
because analysts provide useful information about rms future performance.27 However,
investors seem to underreact to this information, resulting in post-event drift. Interestingly,
given that one measure of earnings surprises is computed using analyst forecasts, even ana-
lysts themselves do not fully incorporate the information contained in the recommendations
of (presumably) other analysts (otherwise, there would be no predictability).
3.7. Aggregate volatility, price shocks, and momentum prots
Table 3 shows that the number of price shocks varies greatly over time. Signicant price
moves are much more common during volatile periods, such as the bursting of the Internet
bubble (20002001) and the nancial crisis (20082009). This nding is probably not overly
surprising (even taking into account that I measure price changes using idiosyncratic returns).
Instead of just focusing on their total number, it is perhaps more interesting to study the
relative proportion of information-based (reported) and no-information (unreported) price
changes.
Fig. 1 plots the evolution over time of average implied volatility, which I dene as the
quarterly average of the constant-maturity 30-day implied volatility from the Chicago Board
Options Exchange (CBOE) Standard & Poors (S&P) 500 Volatility Index (VIX), and of the
27In other words, it is not the case that analyst recommendations by themselves attract the attention of
investors and so induce buying or selling. Instead, it is the information provided by analyst reports that
causes investors to trade in a certain way.
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quarterly ratio of no-information price changes to information-based price changes. The two
series track each other very closely, with their correlation being 0.50.
[Fig. 1 about here.]
However, this graph still likely underestimates the e¤ect, as analyst coverage for a typical
stock increased during my sample period, making it less likely that a price event will be
unaccompanied by an analyst report in the later years. Therefore, I adjust the ratio for
growth in analyst coverage. More specically, I use the ratio of the number of analysts to the
total number of CRSP stocks in a given year (calculated using gures from Table 2) to adjust
the probability of a price event being unreported. For example, the ratio is 0.76 in 1995 and
0.87 in 1996, making the probability of an analyst report being released, holding everything
else constant (including, crucially, the propensity of analysts to issue new recommendations),
14% higher in 1996. Since one should thus expect there to be 14% more analyst reports in
1996 relative to 1995, I adjust the number of information-based price events in 1996 down
by 14%, and use that number to calculate the no-information/information-based ratio.
Fig. 2 shows how this adjusted ratio and implied volatility vary over time. The two are
extremely highly correlated (0.80), tracking each other almost perfectly.28 When the VIX
index is high, both information-based and no-information price shocks occur more frequently,
but the increase is much greater for the latter. One intriguing interpretation here is that
during periods of heightened uncertainty, the relative importance of news about rm-specic
fundamentals falls compared to other shocks to individual stock prices. In other words,
increases in aggregate volatility are not driven primarily by new information about rm
fundamentals. This, however, is pure speculation at this stage and requires future research.29
[Fig. 2 about here.]
The ratio of no-information to information-based price changes could be related to future
performance of momentum trading strategies. In their simplest form, such strategies buy
28When I use the headline news measure to calculate the no-information to information-based price change
ratio, I nd that the ratio and average implied volatility are only weakly correlated (0.2).
29An alternative possibility is that during such periods, analysts simply get overwhelmed by the quantity
of news, making their reports a less useful proxy for new information.
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stocks with high past returns (winners) and short sell stocks with low past returns (losers).
My results show that stocks that experience major price moves, which are quite likely to
nd themselves in winner or loser portfolios, have very di¤erent subsequent performance,
depending on whether these moves were accompanied by information. Since drift follows
only information-based price shocks, one would expect that a lower fraction of such shocks
leads to lower momentum returns. I test this hypothesis by running the following simple
OLS regression:
MOMt = + Ratiot 1 + ut; (8)
where MOM is the quarterly return of the momentum factor UMD, and Ratio is the
ratio of no-information to information-based price shocks in a given quarter.
Over the entire sample period,  is negative (-0.01) and somewhat statistically signicant
(t-stat=-1.68), with an R2 of 4.7%. The coe¢ cient magnitude implies that a one standard de-
viation increase in the Ratio variable predicts a 2.2% decrease in momentum strategy prots
next quarter (relative to the sample average of 1.8%), which is a major e¤ect. This relation
is much stronger in the second half of my sample period (20032009):  is again negative
(-0.02) and now strongly signicant (t-stat=-3.45). A one standard deviation increase in the
Ratio variable forecasts a 5.9% decrease in momentum prots. Furthermore, the R2 jumps
to 32.3%, indicating that the Ratio variable is a very strong predictor of momentum prots
in the 20032009 period.
These results suggest that the phenomena documented in this paper, reversals after no-
information price shocks and drift after information-based shocks, play a signicant role in
explaining the protability of price momentum. They are consistent with theories that argue
momentum arises because investors underreact to new information, and also provide new
insights about the exact channel. Specically, major price movements seem to represent
an important factor in driving future momentum in stock prices (and especially so in the
20032009 period).
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3.8. Post-Regulation FD results
Substantial regulatory changes a¤ecting security analysts occurred during the period
covered in my sample. Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), which mandates that all public
companies must disclose material information to all investors at the same time, was adopted
by the Securities and Exchange Commission in August 2000. Global Analyst Settlement,
which addresses potential conicts of interest for analysts, was concluded in April 2003. As
Loh and Stulz (2011) point out, it is not immediately clear how increased regulation will a¤ect
the quality of analyst reports (measured in terms of how much they help investors make good
decisions). On the one hand, reduced analyst access to sources of useful information, such
as rm executives or analystscolleagues working in other divisions, could hurt their ability
to produce informative research. On the other hand, regulations could eliminate (or at least
mitigate) conicts of interest that adversely impact analyst report quality.30
The shift to more restrictive regulations provides an opportunity to explore the source
of analyst ability to distinguish between price movements that are followed by reversals and
those that are followed by drift. If it stems from information provided by rm insiders or
investment banking colleagues, then one would expect my results to be much weaker after the
regulations went into e¤ect. Table 14 explores this hypothesis. It presents Eq. (4) results for
the period starting in 2003. As before, there is drift after price events accompanied by analyst
recommendations, whereas after those without, there are reversals. The magnitudes for all
the relevant coe¢ cients are almost the same as for the entire 19952009 period, showing that
new regulations did not a¤ect the relation between analyst recommendations and post-large
price movement returns. This evidence suggests that analysts possess at least some skills
that are not dependent on access to privileged information sources.
[Table 14 about here.]
30The evidence so far is mixed. Gintschel and Markov (2004) nd that Reg FD was successful in decreasing
selective disclosure of information to analysts, thereby reducing the price impact of their reports. Kadan,
Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2009) show that recommendations overall became less informative after the
Global Analyst Settlement, though the impact is di¤erent for buys and sells. In a longer sample, however,
Loh and Stulz (2011) obtain opposite results. They nd that analyst recommendations are more likely to be
inuential in the post-Reg FD and the post-Settlement periods.
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4. Conclusion
This paper studies how information presence a¤ects post-event performance of stocks
experiencing large price changes. I use recommendation-issuing analyst reports as a proxy
for whether new publicly available information about a rm is released. After rst restricting
the sample to stocks that are actively covered by analysts, I classify those price shocks
accompanied by newly released analyst reports as information-based and the remaining ones
as not. Both regression analysis and calendar-time portfolios show that no-information price
events experience reversals, while information-based ones exhibit momentum.
These two phenomena are economically very meaningful and statistically signicant. A
portfolio that is long no-information losers and short no-information winners earns annualized
abnormal returns of 20% over a 20-trading day horizon (with a Sharpe ratio of 1.66). A
portfolio that is long information winners and short information losers earns abnormal returns
of 16% per year (with a Sharpe ratio of 1.21). My ndings are robust to various controls,
di¤erent horizons, and exclusion of small and illiquid stocks. They are also not driven by post-
earnings announcement drift. If only earnings announcements are included in the sample,
price shocks are followed by drift regardless of their information status.
I show that my measure of information is complementary to the headline news-based one
used in Chan (2003). Under both measures, the absence of information predicts reversals
after price shocks. However, only the presence of analyst reports results in drift, suggesting
their content is perhaps more relevant to investors than that of newspapers.
My results are consistent with the hypothesis that investors underreact to new information
about a rm and overreact to price movements caused by other factors (such as shifts in
investor sentiment or liquidity shocks). In support of this explanation, I nd that post-event
momentum exists only in those instances when the direction of the price move coincides with
the "direction" of news (as proxied by changes in analyst recommendations). When analyst
reports contradict the price move, I actually document reversals. Furthermore, I show that
information-based price moves are more strongly correlated with future earnings shocks than
33
no-information ones.
One question not addressed here is what are the other drivers of large price moves apart
from new public information. Private information is one candidate, but it is not immediately
clear why one would then observe post-event reversals. To the extent it takes a longer period
of time for private information to be reected in stock prices, one would expect stronger drift
in those situations rather than reversals. Investor sentiment is another possibility, in which
case the question becomes what causes sentiment shifts. A related explanation are liquidity
shocks, where the issue is why they result in such signicant price changes and take such
a long time to dissipate. A potential clue comes from my nding that no-information price
changes are relatively more common during periods of heightened uncertainty. One could
plausibly argue in favor of any of these three factors (private information, changing investor
sentiment, and liquidity shocks) becoming more important during such periods. This is a
topic for future research.
34
References
Altinkilic, O., Hansen, R. S. , 2009. On the information role of stock recommendation
revisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics 48, 1736.
Asquith, P., Mikhail, M. B., Au, A. S., 2005. Information content of equity analyst reports.
Journal of Financial Economics 75, 245282.
Atkins, A. B., Dyl, E. A., 1990. Price reversals, bid-ask spreads, and market e¢ ciency.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 25, 535547.
Barber, B., Lehavy, R., McNichols, M., Trueman, B., 2001. Can investors prot from the
prophets? Security analyst recommendations and stock returns. Journal of Finance 56,
531563.
Barberis, N., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1998. A model of investor sentiment. Journal of
Financial Economics 49, 307343.
Beneish, M. D., 1991. Stock prices and the dissemination of analysts recommendations.
Journal of Business 64, 393416.
Bernard, V. L., Thomas, J. K., 1989. Post-earnings-announcement drift: Delayed price
response or risk premium? Journal of Accounting Research 27, 136.
Bernard, V. L., Thomas, J. K., 1990. Evidence that stock prices do not fully reect the
implications of current earnings for future earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics
13, 305340.
Brav, A., Heaton, J. B., 2002. Competing theories of nancial anomalies. Review of Financial
Studies 15, 575606.
Bremer, M., Sweeney, R. J., 1991. The reversal of large stock-price decreases. Journal of
Finance 46, 747754.
Brown, K. C., Harlow, W. V., Tinic, S. M., 1988. Risk aversion, uncertain information, and
market e¢ ciency. Journal of Financial Economics 22, 355385.
Carhart, M., 1997. On persistence in mutual fund performance. Journal of Finance 52,
5782.
35
Chan, L. K. C., Jegadeesh, N., Lakonishok, J., 1996. Momentum strategies. Journal of
Finance 51, 16811713.
Chan, W. S., 2003. Stock price reaction to news and no-news: Drift and reversal after
headlines. Journal of Financial Economics 70, 223260.
Chen, Q., Francis, J., Schipper, K., 2005. The applicability of the fraud on the market
presumption to analystsForecasts. Unpublished working paper. Duke University.
Cohen, R. B., Polk, C., Vuolteenaho, T., 2003. The value spread. Journal of Finance 58,
609641.
Conrad, J. S., Hameed, A., Niden, C., 1994. Volume and autocovariances in short-horizon
individual security returns. Journal of Finance 49, 13051329.
Cox, D. R., Peterson, D. R., 1994. Stock returns following large one-day declines: Evidence
on short-term reversals and longer-term performance. Journal of Finance 49, 255267.
Cutler, D. M., Poterba, J. M., Summers, L. H., 1989. What moves stock prices? Journal of
Portfolio Management 15, 412.
Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D., Subrahmanyam, A., 1998. Investor psychology and security mar-
ket under- and overreactions. Journal of Finance 53, 18391885.
Davies, P., Canes, J., 1978. Stock prices and the publication of second-hand information.
Journal of Business 51, 4356.
DeBondt, W. F. M., Thaler, R., 1985. Does the stock market overreact? Journal of Finance
40, 793805.
DellaVigna, S., Pollet, J. M., 2007. Demographics and industry returns. American Economic
Review 97, 16671702.
DellaVigna, S., Pollet, J. M., 2009. Investor inattention and Friday earnings announcements.
Journal of Finance 64, 709749.
Elton, E. J., Gruber, M. J., Grossman, S., 1986. Discrete expectational data and portfolio
performance. Journal of Finance 41, 699713.
Fama, E. F., French, K. R., 1992. The cross-section of expected stock returns. Journal of
36
Finance 47, 427465.
Fama, E. F., French, K. R., 1993. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds.
Journal of Financial Economics 33, 356.
Fama, E. F., MacBeth, J. D., 1973. Risk, return, and equilibrium: Empirical tests. Journal
of Political Economy 81, 607636.
Francis, J., Pagach, D., Stephan, J., 1992. The stock market response to earnings announce-
ments released during trading versus nontrading periods. Journal of Accounting Research
30, 165184.
Francis, J., So¤er, L., 1997. The relative informativeness of analystsstock recommendations
and earnings forecast revisions. Journal of Accounting Research 35, 193211.
French, K. R., Roll, R., 1986. Stock return variances: The arrival of information and the
reaction of traders. Journal of Financial Economics 17, 526.
Gintschel, A., Markov, S., 2004. The e¤ectiveness of Regulation FD. Journal of Accounting
and Economics 37, 293314.
Hirshleifer, D., Lim, S. S., Teoh, S. H., 2009. Driven to distraction: extraneous events and
underreaction to earnings news. Journal of Finance 64, 22892325.
Hirshleifer, D., Teoh, S. H., 2003. Limited attention, information disclosure, and nancial
reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 36, 337386.
Hong, H., Lim, T., Stein, J. C., 2000. Bad news travels slowly: Size, analyst coverage, and
the protability of momentum strategies. Journal of Finance 55, 265295.
Hong, H., Stein, J. C., 1999. A unied theory of underreaction, momentum trading, and
overreaction in asset markets. Journal of Finance 54, 21432184.
Hou, K., Peng, L., Xiong, W., 2009. A tale of two anomalies: The Implications of investor
attention for price and earnings momentum. Unpublished working paper. Ohio State Uni-
versity, Baruch College, and Princeton University.
Ivkovic, Z., Jegadeesh, N., 2004. The timing and value of forecast and recommendation
revisions. Journal of Financial Economics 73, 433463.
37
Jegadeesh, N., 1990. Evidence of predictable behavior of security returns. Journal of Finance
45, 881898.
Jegadeesh, N., Kim, J., Krische, S. D., Lee, C. M. C., 2004. Analyzing the analysts: When
do recommendations add value? Journal of Finance 59, 10831124.
Jegadeesh, N., Titman, S., 1993. Returns to buying winners and selling losers: Implications
for stock market e¢ ciency. Journal of Finance 48, 6591.
Kadan, O., Madureira, L., Wang, R., Zach, T., 2009. Conicts of interest and stock recom-
mendations: The e¤ects of the global settlement and related regulations. Review of Financial
Studies 22, 41894217.
Kim, O., Verrecchia, R. E., 1991. Trading volume and price reactions to public announce-
ments. Journal of Accounting Research 29, 302321.
Lee, C. M. C., Swaminathan, B., 2000. Price momentum and trading volume. Journal of
Finance 55, 20172069.
Lehmann, B. N., 1990. Fads, martingales, and market e¢ ciency. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 105, 128.
Llorente, G., Michaely, R., Saar, G., Wang, J., 2002. Dynamic volume-return relation of
individual stocks. Review of Financial Studies 15, 10051047.
Lo, A. W., MacKinlay, C. A., 1990. When are contrarian prots due to stock market over-
reaction? Review of Financial Studies 3, 175205.
Loh, R. K., Stulz, R. M., 2011. When are analyst recommendation changes inuential?
Review of Financial Studies 24, 593627.
Lyon, J. D., Barber, B. M., Tsai, C. L., 1999. Improved methods for tests of long-run
abnormal stock returns. Journal of Finance 54, 165201.
Michaely, R., Womack, K. L., 1999. Conict of interest and the credibility of underwriter
analyst recommendations. Review of Financial Studies 12, 653686.
Mikhail, M. B., Walther, B. R., Willis, R., 2004. Do security analysts exhibit persistent
di¤erences in stock picking ability? Journal of Financial Economics 74, 6791.
38
Mitchell, M. L., Mulherin, J. H., 1994. The impact of public information on the stock market.
Journal of Finance 49, 923950.
Park, J., 1995. A market microstructure explanation for predictable variations in stock
returns following large price changes. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 30,
241256.
Peress, J., 2008. Media coverage and investors attention to earnings announcements. Un-
published working paper. INSEAD.
Petersen, M. A., 2009. Estimating standard errors in nance panel data sets: Comparing
approaches. Review of Financial Studies 22, 435480.
Pritamani, M., Singal, V., 2001. Return predictability following large price changes and
information releases. Journal of Banking and Finance 25, 631656.
Rogers, W. H., 1983. Analyzing complex survey data. Unpublished working paper. Rand
Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.
Rogers, W. H., 1993. Regression standard errors in clustered samples. Stata Technical
Bulletin 13, 1923, reprinted in Stata Technical Bulletin Reprints, vol. 3, 8894.
Roll, R., 1988. R2. Journal of Finance 43, 541566.
Schwert, G. W., 1981. The adjustment of stock prices to information about ination. Journal
of Finance 36, 1529.
Shiller, R. J., 1981. Do stock prices move too much to be justied by subsequent changes in
dividends? American Economic Review 71, 421436.
Shleifer, A., 2000. Ine¢ cient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance. Oxford
University Press, New York.
Stickel, S., 1995. The anatomy of the performance of buy and sell recommendations. Finan-
cial Analysts Journal 51, 2539.
Tetlock, P. C., 2010. Does public nancial news resolve asymmetric information? Review of
Financial Studies 23, 35203557.
Tetlock, P. C., Saar-Tsechansky, M., Macskassy, S., 2008. More than words: Quantifying
39
language to measure rmsfundamentals. Journal of Finance 63, 14371467.
Vega, C., 2006. Stock price reaction to public and private information. Journal of Financial
Economics 82, 103133.
Vuolteenaho, T., 2002. What drives rm-level stock returns? Journal of Finance 57, 233264.
Womack, K. L., 1996. Do brokerage analysts recommendations have investment value?





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Time-series distribution of CRSP stocks, price events, and analyst reports
CRSP stocks column represents all CRSP stocks that were traded at least once during the
calendar year. Price events column gives all stock-trading day observations where the rms
abnormal return either is greater than 10% or lower than -10%. Analysts column represents
all analysts covered by the IBES Recommendations database who published at least one
recommendation-issuing report during the calendar year. Analyst reports column gives the
total number of recommendation-issuing reports published during the calendar year.
Year CRSP stocks Price events Analysts Analyst reports
1995 8,191 90,085 6,207 53,130
1996 8,462 90,777 7,337 60,854
1997 9,038 90,919 8,435 65,921
1998 9,100 113,637 9,104 68,322
1999 8,690 104,170 9,366 68,185
2000 8,359 144,662 9,677 63,916
2001 8,117 112,812 9,926 64,001
2002 7,428 82,005 9,953 72,973
2003 7,013 41,207 9,640 69,996
2004 6,680 22,240 9,412 68,363
2005 6,721 18,168 9,704 67,766
2006 6,739 15,522 10,495 73,367
2007 6,843 18,821 11,239 79,623
2008 6,994 82,718 11,336 80,307




Abnormal returns over a (m;n) window centered on the event day (ARm;n) are estimated
by a four-factor model, consisting of three Fama-French factors (Fama and French, 1993)
plus a momentum factor (Carhart, 1997). All returns are expressed as percentages. Firm
size (ME) is calculated using the closing market price one trading day before the event day.
The total number of analyst reports published over the previous 12 months (analysts) and
the number of analyst reports issued around the event day (report) are obtained from the
IBES Recommendations database. Trading volume (vol) is computed as the percentage of
shares outstanding that is traded on event day.
Panel A: Full sample (N = 166,470)
AR0 ME analysts report vol (%) AR1;5 AR1;10 AR1;20
Mean 2.6 1,375.7 11.1 0.3 4.2 0.9 1.5 2.7
Median 9.3 261.1 8.0 0.0 2.0 -0.2 0.1 0.7
Panel B: Reported negative sample (N = 17,566)
AR0 ME analysts report vol (%) AR1;5 AR1;10 AR1;20
Mean -17.0 3,047.7 14.1 1.7 8.7 0.1 0.4 0.7
Median -13.9 616.1 11.0 1.0 4.9 -0.2 -0.1 0.2
Panel C: Unreported negative sample (N = 52,666)
AR0 ME analysts report vol (%) AR1;5 AR1;10 AR1;20
Mean -13.3 1,002.8 10.2 0.0 3.2 3.3 4.8 7.2
Median -11.9 189.0 8.0 0.0 1.5 2.1 2.9 4.4
Panel D: Reported positive sample (N = 17,056)
AR0 ME analysts report vol (%) AR1;5 AR1;10 AR1;20
Mean 15.7 2,526.8 14.5 1.4 6.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1
Median 12.9 590.0 11.0 1.0 3.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.2
Panel E: Unreported positive sample (N = 79,182)
Rmar0 ME analysts report vol (%) AR1;5 AR1;10 AR1;20
Mean 16.0 1,064.0 10.5 0.0 3.4 -0.2 0.0 -0.4
Median 13.2 219.9 8.0 0.0 1.8 -1.4 -1.3 -0.9
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Table 4
Determinants of post-event returns: Reported vs. unreported
The table reports coe¢ cient estimates of the following regression:
ARm;n = + AR0 + 
0X + u:
ARm;n is the cumulative abnormal return over a period starting m and ending n trading days after
the event day, and AR0 is the event day abnormal return. X includes log size (log(ME)), log
book-to-market ratio (log(BM)), return over the previous 12 months (mom), and trading volume
(vol). Parameter estimates are computed using the WLS approach, where weights are set so that
each cross-section has an equal weight. t-Statistics (in brackets) are calculated using clustered
standard errors.
Panel A: Full sample (N = 120,221)
Intercept AR0 log(ME) log(BM) mom vol R
2 (%)
AR1;5 0.047 -0.062 -0.007 0.002 -0.006 -0.014 1.3
[14.4] [-13.2] [-12.5] [3.2] [-11.0] [-1.2]
AR1;10 0.082 -0.065 -0.012 0.005 -0.012 -0.019 1.9
[17.1] [-6.0] [-15.3] [5.3] [-15.2] [-1.7]
AR1;20 0.140 -0.081 -0.020 0.010 -0.026 -0.028 3.3
[21.4] [-7.1] [-18.7] [8.1] [-20.3] [-2.1]
AR1;40 0.245 -0.115 -0.033 0.022 -0.055 -0.065 6.2
[29.6] [-12.2] [-25.3] [12.7] [-24.2] [-3.4]
Panel B: Unreported samples (N = 93,041)
Intercept AR0 log(ME) log(BM) mom vol R
2 (%)
AR1;5 0.052 -0.095 -0.008 0.002 -0.006 -0.005 1.7
[12.6] [-15.2] [-10.5] [1.9] [-9.7] [-0.3]
AR1;10 0.095 -0.090 -0.014 0.005 -0.011 -0.035 2.1
[14.9] [-5.9] [-12.8] [4.0] [-12.2] [-2.1]
AR1;20 0.164 -0.108 -0.025 0.009 -0.024 -0.044 3.5
[19.0] [-6.8] [-16.4] [5.4] [-16.7] [-2.4]
AR1;40 0.289 -0.157 -0.042 0.020 -0.053 -0.062 6.5
[27.8] [-12.3] [-23.9] [9.1] [-20.9] [-1.9]
Panel C: Reported samples (N = 27,180)
Intercept AR0 log(ME) log(BM) mom vol R
2 (%)
AR1;5 0.025 -0.003 -0.004 0.004 -0.006 -0.001 0.6
[4.0] [-0.4] [-4.2] [2.7] [-7.0] [-0.1]
AR1;10 0.037 -0.012 -0.005 0.005 -0.015 0.009 1.7
[5.3] [-1.6] [-5.2] [3.1] [-11.8] [0.6]
AR1;20 0.059 -0.012 -0.007 0.011 -0.028 -0.004 3.2
[6.4] [-1.2] [-5.4] [4.7] [-12.4] [-0.2]
AR1;40 0.139 -0.025 -0.015 0.025 -0.057 -0.053 5.8
[9.6] [-1.9] [-7.5] [8.2] [-13.5] [-1.9]
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Table 5
Determinants of post-event returns: Information dummy
The table reports coe¢ cient estimates of the following regression:
ARm;n = + AR0 + (AR0  un) + 0X + "(AR0  vol) + u:
ARm;n is the cumulative abnormal return over a period starting m and ending n trading days after
the event day, and AR0 is the event day abnormal return. X includes log size (log(ME)), log
book-to-market ratio (log(BM)), return over the previous 12 months (mom), and trading volume
(vol). un is a dummy variable set to one if no analyst reports were published around the event day.
Parameter estimates are computed using the WLS approach, where weights are set so that each
cross-section has an equal weight. t-Statistics (in brackets) are calculated using clustered standard
errors.
Panel A: Full sample (N = 120,221)
Int: AR0 AR0  un log(ME) log(BM) mom vol AR0  vol R2 (%)
AR1;5 0.041 0.013 -0.106 -0.007 0.002 -0.006 -0.006 0.007 1.5
[11.5] [1.7] [-11.6] [-13.0] [2.8] [-11.2] [-0.5] [0.2]
AR1;10 0.066 0.024 -0.105 -0.012 0.005 -0.012 -0.007 -0.045 2.0
[12.6] [2.5] [-6.3] [-15.5] [5.0] [-15.4] [-0.7] [-1.4]
AR1;20 0.110 0.031 -0.127 -0.020 0.010 -0.026 -0.015 -0.050 3.4
[14.9] [2.7] [-7.0] [-19.0] [7.9] [-20.4] [-1.1] [-1.4]
AR1;40 0.190 0.025 -0.185 -0.034 0.022 -0.055 -0.048 -0.028 6.3
[20.6] [1.5] [-10.1] [-25.6] [12.5] [-24.2] [-2.5] [-0.6]
Panel B: Full sample + price>=$5 (N = 72,898)
Int: AR0 AR0  un log(ME) log(BM) mom vol AR0  vol R2 (%)
AR1;5 0.014 0.024 -0.076 -0.002 0.002 -0.005 -0.003 0.005 0.8
[4.7] [2.5] [-8.9] [-4.8] [2.5] [-9.2] [-0.2] [0.1]
AR1;10 0.015 0.030 -0.078 -0.002 0.005 -0.010 -0.004 -0.040 1.3
[3.9] [3.1] [-7.8] [-3.0] [5.1] [-13.7] [-0.4] [-1.0]
AR1;20 0.026 0.038 -0.080 -0.002 0.011 -0.022 -0.005 -0.052 2.6
[5.0] [3.2] [-5.9] [-2.5] [8.0] [-19.4] [-0.4] [-1.2]
AR1;40 0.048 0.041 -0.087 -0.002 0.025 -0.046 -0.017 -0.071 5.6
[6.4] [2.3] [-4.6] [-1.6] [13.3] [-23.8] [-0.8] [-1.0]
Panel C: Full sample + ME>bottom NYSE decile (N = 78,791)
Int: AR0 AR0  un log(ME) log(BM) mom vol AR0  vol R2 (%)
AR1;5 0.026 0.017 -0.066 -0.003 0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.010 0.8
[7.0] [2.0] [-6.7] [-5.9] [2.8] [-10.3] [-0.5] [-0.3]
AR1;10 0.040 0.022 -0.077 -0.003 0.005 -0.011 -0.012 -0.049 1.4
[7.8] [2.3] [-6.8] [-5.1] [4.5] [-14.4] [-1.2] [-1.7]
AR1;20 0.068 0.029 -0.074 -0.004 0.011 -0.024 -0.024 -0.045 2.6
[9.5] [2.3] [-4.7] [-4.3] [7.6] [-19.4] [-1.7] [-1.1]
AR1;40 0.121 0.037 -0.098 -0.004 0.024 -0.050 -0.063 -0.050 5.7
[11.6] [2.0] [-4.3] [-3.1] [12.9] [-24.1] [-3.1] [-0.8]
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Panel D: Full sample with one day lag (N = 120,234)
Int: AR0 AR0  un log(ME) log(BM) mom vol AR0  vol R2 (%)
AR2;6 0.021 -0.005 -0.042 -0.004 0.002 -0.005 -0.010 0.021 0.7
[6.5] [-0.8] [-5.8] [-7.9] [3.1] [-11.1] [-1.2] [0.9]
AR2;11 0.046 0.006 -0.042 -0.009 0.004 -0.011 -0.013 -0.032 1.4
[9.0] [0.7] [-2.7] [-11.7] [5.1] [-15.4] [-1.5] [-1.2]
AR2;21 0.090 0.014 -0.064 -0.017 0.010 -0.025 -0.020 -0.042 2.8
[12.4] [1.3] [-3.7] [-16.2] [7.9] [-20.6] [-1.7] [-1.3]
AR2;41 0.171 0.010 -0.121 -0.031 0.022 -0.054 -0.054 -0.028 5.8
[18.6] [0.7] [-7.0] [-23.5] [12.6] [-24.4] [-3.1] [-0.7]
Panel E: Full sample + non-earnings announcements (N = 113,631)
Int: AR0 AR0  un log(ME) log(BM) mom vol AR0  vol R2 (%)
AR1;5 0.042 0.008 -0.103 -0.007 0.002 -0.006 -0.008 0.022 1.6
[11.4] [0.9] [-10.5] [-12.6] [2.5] [-10.8] [-0.6] [0.7]
AR1;10 0.068 0.019 -0.104 -0.013 0.005 -0.012 -0.007 -0.037 2.1
[12.5] [1.9] [-6.1] [-15.1] [4.7] [-14.9] [-0.6] [-1.1]
AR1;20 0.115 0.029 -0.131 -0.021 0.010 -0.026 -0.011 -0.050 3.4
[15.0] [2.4] [-6.9] [-18.7] [7.6] [-20.1] [-0.8] [-1.3]
AR1;40 0.198 0.025 -0.194 -0.035 0.022 -0.055 -0.042 -0.040 6.3
[20.9] [1.5] [-10.1] [-25.3] [12.2] [-23.8] [-2.1] [-0.8]
Panel F: Full sample + earnings announcements (N = 6,590)
Int: AR0 AR0  un log(ME) log(BM) mom vol AR0  vol R2 (%)
AR1;5 0.010 0.068 -0.095 -0.002 0.003 -0.006 0.018 -0.112 0.9
[0.6] [2.6] [-3.0] [-1.2] [0.7] [-2.5] [0.7] [-2.1]
AR1;10 0.044 0.063 -0.089 -0.007 0.004 -0.014 -0.007 -0.134 1.7
[2.1] [1.8] [-2.0] [-2.6] [0.7] [-5.1] [-0.2] [-1.8]
AR1;20 0.087 0.059 -0.110 -0.012 0.010 -0.029 -0.056 -0.023 3.5
[3.0] [1.3] [-1.8] [-3.1] [1.4] [-6.1] [-1.1] [-0.2]
AR1;40 0.138 0.039 -0.077 -0.019 0.019 -0.069 -0.121 0.161 6.6
[3.7] [0.7] [-1.0] [-3.9] [2.3] [-8.2] [-1.9] [1.3]
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Table 6
Intercept tests for calendar-time portfolios
The table reports coe¢ cient estimates of the following OLS regression:
Rport;t = port + 
0
portXt + uport;t,
where Rport is a portfolios daily return, and X is a set of factor returns, which includes the
market excess return, size factor, value factor, and momentum factor. t-Statistics are given in
brackets.
In Panel A, the dependent variable is the return of a zero-investment portfolio that is long stocks that
su¤ered no-information price declines and short stocks that enjoyed no-information price increases
(No-information portfolio). In Panel B, the dependent variable is the return of a zero-investment
portfolio that is long stocks that su¤ered information-based price declines and short stocks that
enjoyed information-based price increases (Information-based portfolio). In Panel C, the dependent
variable is the return of a zero-investment portfolio that is long the No-Information portfolio and
short the Information-based portfolio.
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Panel A: No-information portfolio Panel B: Information-based portfolio
 Mkt SMB HML UMD  Mkt SMB HML UMD
5- 0.0044 0.0390 -0.0011 0.0323
days [15.5] [1.8] [-2.9] [1.1]
5- 0.0044 0.0452 -0.0392 0.0737 -0.0011 0.0374 0.0350 0.0383
days [15.5] [2.0] [-0.9] [1.7] [-3.0] [1.2] [0.6] [0.7]
5- 0.0044 0.0188 -0.0389 0.0274 -0.0845 -0.0010 -0.0226 0.0354 -0.0672 -0.1924
days [15.6] [0.8] [-0.8] [0.6] [-2.7] [-2.7] [-0.7] [0.6] [-1.1] [-4.6]
10- 0.0019 0.0205 -0.0008 0.0095
days [11.2] [1.5] [-3.3] [0.5]
10- 0.0019 0.0233 -0.0069 0.0302 -0.0008 0.0185 0.0581 0.0680
days [11.1] [1.7] [-0.2] [1.2] [-3.3] [1.0] [1.5] [1.9]
10- 0.0019 -0.0038 -0.0066 -0.0174 -0.0870 -0.0007 -0.0331 0.0587 -0.0226 -0.1654
days [11.4] [-0.3] [-0.2] [-0.6] [-4.7] [-3.0] [-1.6] [1.6] [-0.6] [-6.5]
20- 0.0008 0.0259 -0.0007 -0.0019
days [7.1] [2.9] [-4.3] [-0.2]
20- 0.0008 0.0317 0.0091 0.0532 -0.0007 0.0087 0.0366 0.0911
days [7.0] [3.4] [0.5] [3.1] [-4.4] [0.7] [1.5] [3.9]
20- 0.0008 0.0077 0.0094 0.0111 -0.0769 -0.0006 -0.0309 0.0370 0.0217 -0.1267
days [7.3] [0.8] [0.5] [0.6] [-6.2] [-4.1] [-2.3] [1.5] [0.9] [-7.6]
40- 0.0003 0.0273 -0.0005 -0.0080
days [3.7] [5.1] [-4.7] [-0.9]
40- 0.0002 0.0331 0.0333 0.0454 -0.0005 0.0039 0.0164 0.1099
days [3.5] [6.0] [3.0] [4.4] [-4.9] [0.4] [0.9] [6.7]
40- 0.0003 0.0090 0.0335 0.0031 -0.0772 -0.0005 -0.0377 0.0169 0.0369 -0.1331
days [4.1] [1.5] [3.1] [0.3] [-10.4] [-4.4] [-4.1] [1.0] [2.1] [-11.5]
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Panel C: Combined portfolio
 Mkt SMB HML UMD
5- 0.0055 0.0056
days [12.3] [0.2]
5- 0.0055 0.0069 -0.0709 0.0363
days [12.3] [0.2] [-1.0] [0.5]
5- 0.0054 0.0409 -0.0711 0.0961 0.1089
days [12.2] [1.0] [-1.0] [1.3] [2.2]
10- 0.0026 0.0109
days [10.0] [0.5]
10- 0.0027 0.0048 -0.0650 -0.0378
days [10.1] [0.2] [-1.5] [-0.9]
10- 0.0026 0.0293 -0.0653 0.0051 0.0784
days [9.9] [1.3] [-1.5] [0.1] [2.7]
20- 0.0015 0.0278
days [8.3] [2.0]
20- 0.0015 0.0230 -0.0275 -0.0379
days [8.4] [1.6] [-1.0] [-1.4]
20- 0.0014 0.0385 -0.0277 -0.0106 0.0498
days [8.2] [2.5] [-1.0] [-0.4] [2.6]
40- 0.0008 0.0353
days [6.6] [3.9]
40- 0.0008 0.0292 0.0168 -0.0645
days [6.7] [3.2] [0.9] [-3.7]
40- 0.0007 0.0467 0.0166 -0.0339 0.0559
days [6.5] [4.7] [0.9] [-1.8] [4.5]
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Table 7
Intercept tests for calendar-time portfolios: Price>$5
The table reports coe¢ cient estimates of the following OLS regression:
Rport;t = port + 
0
portXt + uport;t,
where Rport is a portfolios daily return and X is a set of factor returns, which includes the
market excess return, size factor, value factor, and momentum factor. t-Statistics are given in
brackets.
The analysis is limited to Full sample rms with a stock price above $5. In Panel A, the dependent
variable is the return of a zero-investment portfolio that is long stocks that su¤ered no-information
price declines and short stocks that enjoyed no-information price increases (No-information portfo-
lio). In Panel B, the dependent variable is the return of a zero-investment portfolio that is long stocks
that su¤ered information-based price declines and short stocks that enjoyed information-based price
increases (Information-based portfolio).
Panel A: No-information portfolio Panel B: Information-based portfolio
 Mkt SMB HML UMD  Mkt SMB HML UMD
5- 0.0028 0.0751 -0.0015 0.0356
days [9.6] [3.3] [-4.2] [1.2]
5- 0.0027 0.0777 -0.0309 0.0361 -0.0015 0.0401 -0.0028 0.0449
days [9.6] [3.4] [-0.7] [0.8] [-4.2] [1.3] [-0.0] [0.8]
5- 0.0028 0.0406 -0.0305 -0.0290 -0.1187 -0.0015 -0.0273 -0.0025 -0.0736 -0.2160
days [9.8] [1.6] [-0.7] [-0.6] [-3.8] [-3.9] [-0.8] [-0.0] [-1.2] [-5.3]
10- 0.0012 0.0508 -0.0010 0.0249
days [6.5] [3.5] [-4.3] [1.4]
10- 0.0012 0.0531 -0.0065 0.0248 -0.0010 0.0381 0.0599 0.1091
days [6.5] [3.6] [-0.2] [0.9] [-4.4] [2.0] [1.6] [3.1]
10- 0.0012 0.0192 -0.0061 -0.0349 -0.1089 -0.0009 -0.0183 0.0605 0.0101 -0.1808
days [6.7] [1.2] [-0.2] [-1.2] [-5.4] [-4.0] [-0.9] [1.6] [0.3] [-7.1]
20- 0.0004 0.0487 -0.0007 0.0041
days [3.6] [5.1] [-4.8] [0.3]
20- 0.0004 0.0556 0.0211 0.0605 -0.0008 0.0175 0.0429 0.1159
days [3.5] [5.7] [1.1] [3.3] [-5.0] [1.4] [1.7] [4.9]
20- 0.0005 0.0277 0.0214 0.0114 -0.0896 -0.0007 -0.0311 0.0434 0.0306 -0.1556
days [3.8] [2.6] [1.1] [0.6] [-6.8] [-4.6] [-2.3] [1.7] [1.2] [-9.2]
40- 0.0001 0.0443 -0.0005 0.0058
days [1.4] [7.1] [-5.0] [0.7]
40- 0.0001 0.0516 0.0512 0.0544 -0.0006 0.0218 0.0347 0.1438
days [1.2] [8.1] [4.0] [4.5] [-5.3] [2.5] [2.0] [8.8]
40- 0.0001 0.0227 0.0516 0.0036 -0.0927 -0.0005 -0.0286 0.0353 0.0555 -0.1613
days [1.7] [3.3] [4.0] [0.3] [-10.8] [-4.8] [-3.1] [2.1] [3.2] [-14.0]
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Table 8
Intercept tests for calendar-time portfolios: ME>bottom decile
The table reports coe¢ cient estimates of the following OLS regression:
Rport;t = port + 
0
portXt + uport;t,
where Rport is a portfolios daily return and X is a set of factor returns, which includes the
market excess return, size factor, value factor, and momentum factor. t-Statistics are given in
brackets.
The analysis is limited to Full sample rms with market capitalization above that of rms in
the bottom NYSE decile. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the return of a zero-investment
portfolio that is long stocks that su¤ered no-information price declines and short stocks that enjoyed
no-information price increases (No-information portfolio). In Panel B, the dependent variable is the
return of a zero-investment portfolio that is long stocks that su¤ered information-based price declines
and short stocks that enjoyed information-based price increases (Information-based portfolio).
Panel A: No-information portfolio Panel B: Information-based portfolio
 Mkt SMB HML UMD  Mkt SMB HML UMD
5- 0.0024 0.0760 -0.0014 0.0218
days [7.5] [3.0] [-3.7] [0.7]
5- 0.0024 0.0786 -0.0619 0.0469 -0.0014 0.0210 -0.0231 -0.0004
days [7.5] [3.0] [-1.2] [1.0] [-3.7] [0.7] [-0.4] [-0.0]
5- 0.0024 0.0485 -0.0618 -0.0059 -0.0960 -0.0013 -0.0385 -0.0226 -0.1048 -0.1903
days [7.6] [1.7] [-1.2] [-0.1] [-2.7] [-3.5] [-1.2] [-0.4] [-1.7] [-4.5]
10- 0.0009 0.0481 -0.0009 -0.0005
days [4.6] [3.0] [-3.6] [-0.0]
10- 0.0009 0.0482 -0.0204 0.0083 -0.0009 0.0079 0.0426 0.0676
days [4.6] [2.9] [-0.6] [0.3] [-3.7] [0.4] [1.1] [1.9]
10- 0.0010 0.0154 -0.0200 -0.0494 -0.1051 -0.0008 -0.0396 0.0431 -0.0157 -0.1522
days [4.8] [0.9] [-0.6] [-1.5] [-4.7] [-3.4] [-1.9] [1.1] [-0.4] [-5.8]
20- 0.0002 0.0462 -0.0008 -0.0158
days [1.7] [4.6] [-4.8] [-1.3]
20- 0.0002 0.0536 0.0311 0.0614 -0.0008 -0.0056 0.0271 0.0904
days [1.6] [5.2] [1.5] [3.1] [-5.0] [-0.4] [1.1] [3.8]
20- 0.0002 0.0253 0.0315 0.0117 -0.0907 -0.0007 -0.0445 0.0275 0.0220 -0.1247
days [1.9] [2.3] [1.5] [0.6] [-6.4] [-4.7] [-3.2] [1.1] [0.9] [-7.2]
40- 0.0000 0.0438 -0.0005 -0.0096
days [0.0] [6.6] [-4.9] [-1.1]
40- 0.0000 0.0527 0.0553 0.0678 -0.0006 0.0038 0.0162 0.1248
days [-0.2] [7.8] [4.0] [5.3] [-5.1] [0.4] [0.9] [7.4]
40- 0.0000 0.0235 0.0556 0.0166 -0.0934 -0.0005 -0.0372 0.0166 0.0528 -0.1315
days [0.3] [3.3] [4.1] [1.2] [-10.3] [-4.7] [-3.9] [0.9] [2.9] [-10.9]
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Table 9
Intercept tests for calendar-time portfolios: Value-weighted portfolios
The table reports coe¢ cient estimates of the following OLS regression:
Rport;t = port + 
0
portXt + uport;t,
where Rport is a portfolios daily return and X is a set of factor returns, which includes the
market excess return, size factor, value factor, and momentum factor. t-Statistics are given in
brackets.
In Panel A, the dependent variable is the value-weighted return of a zero-investment portfolio that is
long stocks that su¤ered no-information price declines and short stocks that enjoyed no-information
price increases (No-information portfolio). In Panel B, the dependent variable is the value-weighted
return of a zero-investment portfolio that is long stocks that su¤ered information-based price declines
and short stocks that enjoyed information-based price increases (Information-based portfolio).
Panel A: No-information portfolio Panel B: Information-based portfolio
 Mkt SMB HML UMD  Mkt SMB HML UMD
5- 0.0018 0.1449 -0.0021 0.0778
days [4.6] [4.6] [-4.4] [2.1]
5- 0.0018 0.1617 -0.0978 0.1959 -0.0021 0.1020 -0.0443 0.2506
days [4.5] [5.0] [-1.5] [3.2] [-4.5] [2.7] [-0.6] [3.5]
5- 0.0019 0.1179 -0.0973 0.1189 -0.1405 -0.0021 0.0408 -0.0439 0.1430 -0.1961
days [4.6] [3.4] [-1.5] [1.8] [-3.2] [-4.3] [1.0] [-0.6] [1.8] [-3.7]
10- 0.0008 0.0688 -0.0014 -0.0176
days [2.9] [3.3] [-4.3] [-0.7]
10- 0.0008 0.0781 -0.0476 0.1055 -0.0014 0.0090 -0.0424 0.2718
days [2.9] [3.6] [-1.1] [2.6] [-4.5] [0.4] [-0.8] [5.6]
10- 0.0008 0.0462 -0.0472 0.0495 -0.1022 -0.0013 -0.0384 -0.0418 0.1886 -0.1518
days [3.0] [2.0] [-1.1] [1.1] [-3.5] [-4.3] [-1.4] [-0.8] [3.6] [-4.4]
20- 0.0001 0.0669 -0.0011 -0.0228
days [0.6] [4.4] [-4.6] [-1.2]
20- 0.0001 0.0834 0.0171 0.1548 -0.0011 -0.0019 -0.0541 0.2212
days [0.4] [5.4] [0.5] [5.3] [-4.8] [-0.1] [-1.4] [6.2]
20- 0.0001 0.0608 0.0174 0.1151 -0.0724 -0.0011 -0.0387 -0.0537 0.1566 -0.1178
days [0.6] [3.6] [0.6] [3.7] [-3.4] [-4.6] [-1.9] [-1.4] [4.1] [-4.6]
40- -0.0001 0.0625 -0.0009 -0.0454
days [-0.4] [5.6] [-5.1] [-3.4]
40- -0.0001 0.0778 0.0649 0.1274 -0.0009 -0.0246 -0.0462 0.2175
days [-0.6] [6.9] [2.8] [5.9] [-5.4] [-1.8] [-1.7] [8.5]
40- -0.0001 0.0561 0.0652 0.0892 -0.0696 -0.0009 -0.0597 -0.0458 0.1558 -0.1127





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Intercept tests for calendar-time portfolios: Headline news-based portfolios
The table reports coe¢ cient estimates of the following OLS regression:
Rport;t = port + 
0
portXt + uport;t,
where Rport is a portfolios daily return and X is a set of factor returns, which includes the
market excess return, size factor, value factor, and momentum factor. t-Statistics are given in
brackets. The sample covers all stocks in the headline news data set used in Chan (2003). In
Panel A, the dependent variable is the return of a zero-investment portfolio that is long stocks that
su¤ered no-information price declines and short stocks that enjoyed no-information price increases
(No-information portfolio). In Panel B, the dependent variable is the return of a zero-investment
portfolio that is long stocks that su¤ered information-based price declines and short stocks that
enjoyed information-based price increases (Information-based portfolio).
Panel A: No-information portfolio Panel B: Information-based portfolio
 Mkt SMB HML UMD  Mkt SMB HML UMD
5- 0.0077 -0.0414 0.0017 -0.0779
days [7.6] [-0.4] [2.1] [-1.0]
5- 0.0078 -0.0990 0.0663 -0.1273 0.0018 -0.2236 -0.2387 -0.2394
days [7.6] [-0.6] [0.3] [-0.5] [2.1] [-1.5] [-1.5] [-1.1]
5- 0.0078 -0.0980 0.0677 -0.1327 -0.0119 0.0019 -0.2148 -0.2273 -0.2842 -0.0996
days [7.6] [-0.6] [0.4] [-0.5] [-0.1] [2.2] [-1.5] [-1.4] [-1.2] [-0.7]
10- 0.0037 -0.0591 0.0007 -0.0687
days [5.3] [-0.9] [1.5] [-1.5]
10- 0.0037 -0.0086 0.0557 0.0887 0.0007 -0.0473 -0.0797 0.0591
days [5.3] [-0.1] [0.4] [0.5] [1.4] [-0.6] [-0.9] [0.5]
10- 0.0038 -0.0002 0.0667 0.0454 -0.0959 0.0007 -0.0403 -0.0706 0.0234 -0.0794
days [5.3] [-0.0] [0.5] [0.2] [-0.8] [1.5] [-0.5] [-0.8] [0.2] [-1.0]
20- 0.0022 -0.0158 0.0003 -0.0231
days [4.9] [-0.4] [0.9] [-0.8]
20- 0.0022 0.0423 0.0786 0.0988 0.0003 -0.0229 -0.0377 0.0082
days [4.9] [0.5] [0.9] [0.8] [0.8] [-0.4] [-0.7] [0.1]
20- 0.0023 0.0515 0.0906 0.0517 -0.1047 0.0003 -0.0189 -0.0325 -0.0121 -0.0451
days [5.0] [0.7] [1.1] [0.4] [-1.4] [0.9] [-0.4] [-0.6] [-0.1] [-0.9]
40- 0.0011 -0.0085 -0.0002 -0.0537
days [3.6] [-0.3] [-0.9] [-3.0]
40- 0.0011 0.0264 0.0694 0.0549 -0.0002 0.0029 0.0454 0.1029
days [3.6] [0.5] [1.2] [0.7] [-1.1] [0.1] [1.2] [2.0]
40- 0.0011 0.0316 0.0762 0.0283 -0.0591 -0.0002 0.0049 0.0480 0.0929 -0.0221




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Presence of information and future earnings
The table reports coe¢ cient estimates of the following regression:
EarnSuri = + AR0 + (AR0  un) + 0X + "(AR0  vol) + u:
EarnSuri is the earnings surprise in quarter i (relative to the event day), computed as the abnormal
announcement return (Panel A), standardized unexpected earnings measured using analyst forecasts
(Panel B), and standardized unexpected earnings calculated using a seasonal random walk model
(Panel C). AR0 is the event day abnormal return. X includes log size (log(ME)), log book-to-
market ratio (log(BM)), return over the previous 12 months (mom), and trading volume (vol).
un is a dummy variable set to one if no analyst reports were published around the event day.
t-Statistics (in brackets) are calculated using clustered standard errors.
Panel A: Abnormal announcement return (N = 110,010)
Int: R0 R0  un log(ME) log(BM) mom vol R0  vol R2 (%)
EarnSur1 0.015 0.014 -0.022 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.045 -0.074 0.3
[2.3] [2.4] [-3.2] [-2.2] [1.3] [-2.5] [-4.0] [-4.1]
EarnSur2 0.027 -0.003 -0.017 -0.004 0.000 -0.003 -0.041 -0.010 0.4
[4.2] [-0.5] [-2.4] [-4.0] [-0.3] [-3.5] [-3.7] [-0.6]
Panel B: SUE - analyst forecasts (N = 83,744)
Int: R0 R0  un log(ME) log(BM) mom vol R0  vol R2 (%)
EarnSur1 -6.563 3.900 -0.837 0.737 -0.660 0.481 -2.074 -2.811 1.2
[-7.3] [9.5] [-1.4] [6.4] [-3.4] [5.5] [-2.5] [-2.4]
EarnSur2 -2.496 1.948 -0.787 0.252 -0.329 0.211 -1.451 -0.557 0.5
[-6.0] [4.1] [-1.5] [3.9] [-4.1] [4.1] [-1.4] [-0.4]
Panel C: SUE - seasonal random walk (N = 82,064)
Int: R0 R0  un log(ME) log(BM) mom vol R0  vol R2 (%)
EarnSur1 -3.188 11.541 -3.606 -0.263 -0.651 2.773 -8.874 -7.088 0.4
[-1.6] [5.0] [-1.7] [-0.8] [-0.9] [5.1] [-0.9] [-0.8]
EarnSur2 3.943 10.866 -7.354 -0.884 0.918 1.095 -0.429 1.348 0.2
[2.0] [7.2] [-3.3] [-3.1] [1.7] [4.1] [-0.1] [0.3]
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Table 14
Determinants of post-event returns: 20032009
The table reports coe¢ cient estimates of the following regression:
ARm;n = + AR0 + (AR0  un) + 0X + "(AR0  vol) + u:
ARm;n is the cumulative abnormal return over a period starting m and ending n trading days after
the event day, and AR0 is the event day abnormal return. X includes log size (log(ME)), log
book-to-market ratio (log(BM)), return over the previous 12 months (mom), and trading volume
(vol). un is a dummy variable set to one if no analyst reports were published around the event day.
Parameter estimates are computed using the WLS approach, where weights are set so that each
cross-section has an equal weight. t-Statistics (in brackets) are calculated using clustered standard
errors.
Panel A: Full sample (N = 39,259)
Int: AR0 AR0  un log(ME) log(BM) mom vol AR0  vol R2 (%)
AR1;5 0.031 0.031 -0.077 -0.004 0.002 -0.010 -0.001 -0.032 0.8
[4.8] [2.8] [-5.8] [-4.3] [1.7] [-10.5] [-0.1] [-0.9]
AR1;10 0.062 0.041 -0.063 -0.009 0.004 -0.021 -0.002 -0.110 1.5
[7.2] [3.1] [-2.3] [-6.6] [2.5] [-14.6] [-0.1] [-2.8]
AR1;20 0.110 0.037 -0.084 -0.015 0.009 -0.041 -0.001 -0.133 2.6
[8.8] [2.5] [-2.9] [-7.6] [4.6] [-16.4] [-0.1] [-3.0]
AR1;40 0.216 0.017 -0.158 -0.027 0.024 -0.087 -0.023 -0.104 5.5
[12.8] [0.8] [-5.9] [-10.6] [8.2] [-20.7] [-1.0] [-1.8]
Panel B: Full sample + price>=$5 (N = 21,564)
Int: AR0 AR0  un log(ME) log(BM) mom vol AR0  vol R2 (%)
AR1;5 -0.006 0.019 -0.044 0.000 0.000 -0.008 0.008 -0.009 0.8
[-1.2] [1.4] [-3.5] [0.5] [0.2] [-8.2] [0.5] [-0.1]
AR1;10 -0.015 0.016 -0.034 0.002 0.002 -0.016 0.012 -0.073 1.8
[-2.5] [1.2] [-2.3] [2.0] [1.1] [-11.6] [0.8] [-1.5]
AR1;20 -0.018 0.013 -0.028 0.002 0.005 -0.033 0.018 -0.094 3.9
[-2.0] [0.8] [-1.4] [1.9] [2.4] [-13.9] [0.9] [-1.7]
AR1;40 -0.029 0.009 -0.045 0.006 0.021 -0.070 0.016 -0.113 8.4
[-2.3] [0.4] [-1.6] [3.4] [6.4] [-17.8] [0.6] [-1.3]
Panel C: Full sample + ME>bottom NYSE decile (N = 23,712)
Int: AR0 AR0  un log(ME) log(BM) mom vol AR0  vol R2 (%)
AR1;5 0.008 0.018 -0.037 -0.001 0.000 -0.010 0.000 -0.027 0.9
[1.4] [1.5] [-2.3] [-1.5] [-0.1] [-9.0] [0.0] [-0.7]
AR1;10 0.016 0.012 -0.051 -0.002 0.000 -0.019 -0.002 -0.078 1.8
[2.1] [0.9] [-2.8] [-2.0] [0.3] [-12.0] [-0.2] [-2.2]
AR1;20 0.026 0.004 -0.036 -0.002 0.006 -0.037 -0.011 -0.094 3.5
[2.4] [0.2] [-1.6] [-1.6] [2.5] [-13.4] [-0.6] [-1.9]
AR1;40 0.029 0.001 -0.062 0.001 0.023 -0.076 -0.046 -0.097 8.4
[1.9] [0.0] [-2.0] [0.3] [7.4] [-17.3] [-1.8] [-1.3]
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Continued from previous page:
Panel D: Full sample with one day lag (N = 39,262)
Int: AR0 AR0  un log(ME) log(BM) mom vol AR0  vol R2 (%)
AR2;6 0.018 -0.003 -0.025 -0.002 0.001 -0.009 -0.009 0.014 0.5
[3.2] [-0.4] [-2.4] [-2.7] [0.5] [-10.5] [-0.8] [0.5]
AR2;11 0.047 0.008 -0.010 -0.007 0.002 -0.019 -0.012 -0.066 1.2
[5.8] [0.7] [-0.4] [-5.3] [1.5] [-14.7] [-1.0] [-2.1]
AR2;21 0.096 0.006 -0.028 -0.013 0.008 -0.040 -0.010 -0.096 2.3
[7.8] [0.4] [-1.0] [-6.7] [3.9] [-16.5] [-0.7] [-2.5]
AR2;41 0.203 -0.013 -0.098 -0.025 0.023 -0.085 -0.033 -0.075 5.2
[12.0] [-0.7] [-3.8] [-9.9] [7.8] [-21.0] [-1.5] [-1.5]
Panel E: Full sample + non-earnings announcements (N = 36,004)
Int: AR0 AR0  un log(ME) log(BM) mom vol AR0  vol R2 (%)
AR1;5 0.030 0.025 -0.075 -0.004 0.001 -0.010 -0.004 -0.014 0.7
[4.6] [2.0] [-5.1] [-4.0] [1.3] [-9.9] [-0.3] [-0.4]
AR1;10 0.062 0.035 -0.064 -0.009 0.004 -0.021 -0.001 -0.099 1.5
[6.9] [2.5] [-2.3] [-6.3] [2.4] [-14.0] [-0.1] [-2.5]
AR1;20 0.113 0.032 -0.089 -0.015 0.009 -0.042 0.003 -0.127 2.5
[8.5] [2.0] [-2.9] [-7.4] [4.5] [-16.2] [0.1] [-2.8]
AR1;40 0.225 0.013 -0.171 -0.028 0.025 -0.087 -0.017 -0.105 5.5
[12.6] [0.6] [-6.1] [-10.5] [8.1] [-19.8] [-0.7] [-1.8]
Panel F: Full sample + earnings announcements (N = 3,255)
Int: AR0 AR0  un log(ME) log(BM) mom vol AR0  vol R2 (%)
AR1;5 0.032 0.118 -0.075 -0.004 0.011 -0.010 0.040 -0.207 2.6
[0.9] [3.9] [-2.0] [-1.1] [1.2] [-2.7] [1.4] [-4.3]
AR1;10 0.058 0.115 -0.030 -0.008 0.009 -0.019 0.015 -0.239 3.1
[1.6] [2.9] [-0.5] [-1.7] [1.0] [-4.6] [0.4] [-3.8]
AR1;20 0.117 0.083 -0.025 -0.014 0.020 -0.037 -0.002 -0.190 5.4
[2.5] [1.6] [-0.4] [-2.4] [1.7] [-4.5] [-0.0] [-2.8]
AR1;40 0.242 0.010 -0.027 -0.029 0.027 -0.088 -0.077 -0.014 7.6
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